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T

his Article examines the nature of the guarantee of selfrepresentation as exercised in the Milosevic case at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The paper
debates the manner in which the Milosevic Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY balanced the competing interests of the pro
se rights of the Accused and the need for expedition in the trial. It is argued that the Trial Chamber disproportionately restricted the rights of the
Accused in a dubiously reasoned decision, a mistake that was partially
remedied by the Appeals Chamber, but which has left a legacy that potentially endangers the rights of the accused which subsist in an already
precarious environment. The Article concludes with an examination of
the merits of hybrid representation in high-level cases such as that of
Slobodan Milosevic.
SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION
The death of Slobodan Milosevic in his cell at the United Nations Detention Unit of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague on March 11, 2006, 1 has raised the question
of what can now be salvaged from a trial that ran for over four years and
generated forests of testimony, exhibits, litigation, decisions, and appeals. 2 One question that must be asked in the wake of the former President’s death is whether it is appropriate for high-profile criminal defendants to represent themselves. “Once left to a handful of political dissidents and lawyer-haters, self-representation no longer is rare.” 3 Highprofile defendants often seek to utilize their statutory right to represent
themselves in person before international and regional tribunals in a bid
to secure control over a specific defense strategy, often politically motivated. 4

1. Molly Moore & Daniel Williams, Milosevic Found Dead in Prison; Genocide
Trial Is Left Without a Final Judgment, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2006, at A01.
2. Over forty-nine thousand pages of transcript were recorded by the last day of trial
on March 1, 2006. Trial Tr. at 49,190 (Mar. 1, 2006), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No.
IT-02-54-T, available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/060301IT.htm. By November
22, 2006, there had been 2,256 filings, comprising 63,775 pages; 930 prosecution exhibits; 85,526 pages of prosecution evidence; 117 videos of prosecution evidence; and
1,245,084 pages of prosecution disclosure, 930,553 of which were under ICTY Rule 68..
3. Tom Sowa, Rising to Their Own Defense; High Legal Bills Just One Reason for
“Pro Se” Cases, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Mar. 29, 1999, at A1.
4. Those who have featured prominently in the public eye include Theodore Kaczynski, John Allen Muhammad, Zacarias Moussaoui, Ted Bundy, Douglas Clark, Charles
Manson, Colin Ferguson, Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, Vojislav Seselj, Hinga Norman,
and Slobodan Milosevic.
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An all-encompassing set of principles regarding the scope of the right
of criminal defendants to self-representation has not yet been expressed. 5
The relative significance of the right to self-representation 6 “needs to be
defined carefully, particularly in situations when it comes into apparent
conflict with the due process guarantee of a fair trial.” 7 There are “inherent tensions between these competing interests” which necessitate “close
judicial scrutiny.” 8 International criminal courts and tribunals must address this tension in a systematic fashion in order to obtain a satisfactory
equilibrium between these competing interests.
This Article contends that the improvised approach adopted by the
Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Milosevic 9 to assess the importance of the pro se right weighed disproportionately on the side of
expedition. This imbalance was somewhat remedied by the subsequent
decision of the Appeals Chamber. As it stands, however, the jurisprudence generated by this case has markedly broadened the potential circumstances in which the right to self-representation may be curtailed,
leaving open the possibility of further abrogation not only of the pro se
right but also of the other minimum guarantees from which the right to a
defense is cast.
1.1: The Right to Self-Representation
In Milosevic, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY (Trial Chamber) recognized that “the international and regional conventions (in similar language) plainly articulate a right to defend oneself in person.” 10 The right
to self-representation appears in identical terms in Articles 14(3)(d) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 11
21(4)(d) of the ICTY Statute, 12 20(4)(d) of the Statute of the Interna-

5. Robert R. Homiak, Comment, Faretta v. California and the Pro Se Defense: The
Constitutional Right of Self-Representation, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 897, 936 (1976).
6. The terms “pro se” and “self-representation” will be used interchangeably in this
paper.
7. Homiak, supra note 5, at 936.
8. Id.
9. All references herein to Prosecutor v. Milosevic or Milosevic are to the case of
Slobodan Milosevic.
10. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the
Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, para. 36 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/decision-e/040403.htm.
11. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(3)(d), adopted Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
12. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art.
21(4)(d), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
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tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 13 and 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). 14 Articles 67(1)(d) of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 15 6(3)(c) of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights) (ECHR), 16
8(2)(d) of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), 17 and
16(d) of the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major
War Criminals of the European Axis (Nuremberg Charter) 18 contain
analogous provisions.
The right to self-representation is, under the ICTY Statute, one of a basic set of “minimum guarantees” to which the accused is entitled “in full
equality.” 19 Among the other guarantees listed in Article 21(4) of the
ICTY Statute are defendants’ right to remain silent;20 to confront the witnesses against them; 21 “to be tried without undue delay;” 22 and to courtappointed counsel “where the interests of justice so require, and without

13. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 20(4)(d), Nov. 8,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1602 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
14. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 17(4)(d), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 145 [hereinafter Statute of the SCSL].
15. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 67, opened for signature
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (granting the right “to conduct the defence in person or through legal assistance of the accused’s choosing, . . . and
to have legal assistance assigned by the Court in any case where the interests of justice so
require”).
16. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(3)(c), Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)] (granting an accused the right “to
defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not
sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice
so require”).
17. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.
8(2)(d), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]
(granting an accused “[t]he right to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal
counsel of his own choosing”).
18. Agreement by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 16(d), Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 279 (granting an accused “the right to conduct his own defence before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of Counsel”).
19. ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 21(4).
20. Id. art. 21(4)(g).
21. Id. art. 21(4)(e).
22. Id. art. 21(4)(c).
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payment by him” in the case of indigence. 23 The Appeals Chamber of the
ICTY has acknowledged that by placing the right to self-representation
“on a structural par” with these guarantees, the drafters of the ICTY
Statute recognized the right to self-representation as “an indispensable
cornerstone of justice.” 24
Article 21(4)(d) incorporates a “binary opposition between representation ‘through legal assistance’ and representation ‘in person.’” 25 The personal character of the individual’s procedural rights is recognized by acknowledging the defendant’s right to make his own choice. 26 The pro se
right “embodies one of the most cherished ideals of civilization: the right
of an individual to determine his own destiny.” 27 Furthermore, the pro se
process “affirm[s] the dignity and autonomy of the accused.” 28 On the
other hand, it has been recognized that “[t]he presence of counsel serves
both to protect the accused from prosecutorial overreaching and to preserve society’s interest in the integrity of the judicial process.” 29 The
benefits derived from the presence of counsel in certain circumstances
have spurred contemporary criminal tribunals to make self-representation
a qualified, and not an absolute, guarantee. 30
It is widely recognized that the right to self-representation “is not categorically inviolable.” 31 For example, various common law jurisdictions
recognize the capacity of courts to restrict the pro se right in sexual as-

23. Id. art. 21(4)(d).
24. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 11
(Nov. 1, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/decisione/041101.htm.
25. Id.
26. See Note, The Accused as Co-Counsel: The Case for the Hybrid Defense, 12 VAL.
U. L. REV. 329, 350 (1978) [hereinafter Hybrid Defense].
27. People v. Gordon, 688 N.Y.S.2d 380, 382 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
28. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984).
29. Judith Welcom, Note, Assistance of Counsel: A Right to Hybrid Representation,
57 B.U. L. REV. 570, 571 (1977).
30. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on the Application
of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation Under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of
the Special Court, paras. 9, 15 (June 8, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/CDFdecisions.html (scroll down page to “Trial Chamber Decisions”); Prosecutor v. Seselj,
Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel
to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 20 (May 9, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/seselj/trialc/decision-e/030509.htm.
31. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of
the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 12 (Nov. 1,
2004).
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sault trials “to protect vulnerable witnesses from trauma.” 32 Furthermore,
in the United States, the right to self-representation does not extend to
appellate proceedings. 33 Civil law jurisdictions further restrict the pro se
right by often forcing representation by counsel upon defendants “in serious criminal cases.” 34 This practice has been upheld by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 35
The importance of the right to self-representation is not diminished by
the fact that other interests may supersede it. 36 As eloquently put by Colquitt, “[j]ustice, it seems, begs for the striking of balances and the fashioning of procedural accommodations.” 37 It is, of course, essential to
32. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 12
(Nov. 1, 2004). These common law jurisdictions include England (Youth Justice and
Criminal Evidence Act, 1999, part II, c. II, §§ 34–35 (Eng. & Wales)), Scotland (Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, sec. 288C(1), as amended by the Sexual Offences
(Procedure and Evidence) (Scotland) Act 2002, asp. 9, § 1), Canada (Criminal Code, RS
1985, sec. 486 (2.3), New Zealand (Evidence Act 1908, 1908 S.N.Z. No. 56, § 23F), and
Australia (Crimes Act, 1914, §§ 15YF–15YH (as amended); Evidence Act, 1906, § 106G
(W.A.); Criminal Procedure Act, 1986, § 294A (N.S.W.); Sexual Offences (Evidence and
Procedure) Act, 1983, § 5 (N. Terr.); Evidence Act, 1977, § 21(L)-(S) (Queensl.)). Milosevic, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 12 & n. 33–37 (citing the foregoing national statutes).
33. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152 (2000).
34. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 12
n.38 (Nov. 1, 2004) (citing C. PR. PÉN. Arts. 274, 317 (Fr.); Strafprozeßordnung [StPO]
[Code of Criminal Procedure] Apr. 7, 1987, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] 1074,
§140 (F.R.G.); Code D’Instruction Criminelle [Criminal Instruction Code] of 9 December 1808 art. 294 (Belg.); Arts. 282–83, Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of
Korea; Art. 71(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia);
Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, paras. 16–17 (citing Section 731 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act; Criminal Procedure Act of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia arts. 13, 71). Beginning in 1992, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia consisted of Serbia and Montenegro. Montenegro declared independence
from the political entity of Serbia and Montenegro on June 3, 2006. U.S. Dep’t of State,
Bureau of Eur. and Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: Montenegro (Aug. 2006),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/70949.htm.
35. See, e.g., Croissant v. F.R.G., 237 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 20, 32 (1992). The
United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) has also upheld a national court’s requirement that persons not possessing a law degree be represented by counsel. Torregrosa
Lafuente v. Spain, Communication No. 866/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/866/1999
(2001).
36. Joseph A. Colquitt, Hybrid Representation: Standing the Two-Sided Coin on Its
Edge, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 65 (2003).
37. Id. at 127.
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“balance the rights and interests of defendants against other important
rights and interests in a manner fair to all” parties, without excluding victims, witnesses, or defendants. 38
Recognizing that a defendant’s right to represent himself or herself is
subject to some limitations does not, however, resolve the issue at hand.
It must also be shown that the restriction applied was justified and proportionate to the interest pursued. Section Two explores the balancing of
the interests of the accused with the interests of victims, witnesses, and
the Tribunal itself. Section Three will analyze the balancing of these
rights in the curtailment of the pro se right in Milosevic, and Section Four
expands upon the need for proportionality in such balancing exercises.
1.2: Milosevic at the ICTY
Slobodan Milosevic was indicted at the Yugoslavia Tribunal on May
24, 1999, for alleged atrocities committed in Kosovo. 39 He remained in
power as Yugoslav President until October 2000 40 and was re-elected
leader of Serbia’s Socialist Party in November 2000. 41 The former President was finally transferred to The Hague in June 2001, 42 and, in November 2001, was charged with twenty-nine criminal counts, including
genocide, with regard to his involvement in the Bosnian War from 1992–
95. 43 Two further indictments were brought against him, with five counts

38. Id. at 65.
39. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment (May 24, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ii990524e.htm. The Kosovo Indictment was twice subsequently amended, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37I,
Amended
Indictment
(June
29,
2001),
available
at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ai010629e.htm; Prosecutor v. Milosevic,
Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Second Amended Indictment (Oct. 29, 2001), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-2ai011029e.htm, and later joined with the
indictments concerning Bosnia and Croatia, see infra note 47 and accompanying text.
40. Alissa J. Rubin, A Year Gone By, but Still a Pall Remains; Yugoslavia: Anniversary of Milosevic’s Toppling Comes Amid Continued Economic Despair as Well as Political Bickering and Stalled Reforms, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at A22.
41. Carlotta Gall, Milosevic Wins Re-election as Leader of Socialist Party, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000, at A10.
42. R. Jeffrey Smith, Serb Leaders Hand Over Milosevic for Trial by War Crimes
Tribunal; Extradition Sparks Crisis in Belgrade, WASH. POST, June 29, 2001, at A1.
43. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-01-51-I Indictment (Nov. 22, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ii011122e.htm; see William Drozdiak, Milosevic to Face Genocide Trial for Role in the War in Bosnia; Yugoslav ExLeader First Head of State to Be So Charged, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2001, at A22. The
Bosnia Indictment was joined with those concerning Croatia and Kosovo, see infra note
47 and accompanying text, and subsequently amended. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No.
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concerning his activities in Kosovo in 1999 44 and a further thirty-two
relating to Croatia in 1991–92. 45 The three indictments were joined together by the Appeals Chamber, 46 and the trial commenced on February
12, 2002. 47 Until his death on March 11, 2006, Milosevic stood accused
of sixty-six counts, comprising seventeen substantive crimes. 48
1.3: Milosevic: Self-Representation
From the outset, Slobodan Milosevic indicated that he wished to represent himself and, accordingly, did not wish to be represented by coun-

IT-02-54-T,
Amended
Indictment
(Apr.
21,
2004),
available
at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ai040421-e.htm.
44. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Second Amended Indictment
(Oct. 29, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil2ai011029e.htm.
45. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Amended Indictment (July
28, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-2ai020728e.htm.
46. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case Nos. IT-99-37-AR73, IT-01-50-AR73, IT-01-51AR73, Decision on Prosecution Interlocutory Appeal from Refusal to Order Joinder (Feb.
1,
2002),
available
at
http://www.un.org/icty/milutinovic/appeal/decision-e/
20201JD317089.htm. See Milosevic, Case Nos. IT-99-37-AR73, IT-01-50-AR73, IT-0151-AR73, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution Interlocutory Appeal from Refusal to
Order Joinder (Apr. 18, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/
appeal/decision-e/020418.htm. The Trial Chamber had joined two of the three indictments, those relating to Croatia and Bosnia, but ordered the Kosovo indictment to be tried
separately. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case Nos. IT-99-37-PT, IT-01-50-PT, IT-01-51-PT,
Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Joinder (Dec. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/milutinovic/appeal/decision-e/11213JD516912.htm. The Trial
Chamber has, on more than one occasion, contemplated the possibility of severance. See,
e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Further Order on Future Conduct of
the Trial Relating to Severance of One or More Indictments (July 21, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/051122.htm; id., IT-02-54-T, Decision in
Relation to Severance, Extension of Time and Rest (Dec. 12, 2005).
47. Trial Tr. at 1 (Feb. 12, 2002), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T,
available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/020212IT.htm.
48. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Amended Indictment,
paras. 34–83 (July 28, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil2ai020728e.htm (charging Milosevic with thirty-two counts); Prosecutor v. Milosevic,
Case No. IT-02-54-T, Amended Indictment, paras. 32–45 (Apr. 21, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ai040421-e.htm (charging Milosevic with
twenty-nine counts); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Second Amended
Indictment, paras. 62–68 (Oct. 29, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/
english/mil-2ai011029e.htm (charging Milosevic and others with five counts). As noted,
the Appeals Chamber joined the three indictments together in February 2002. Supra note
46 and accompanying text.
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sel. 49 This appears to have been motivated by his non-recognition of the
Tribunal’s legitimacy. 50 Judge May assured the Accused in July 2001
that “[y]ou do have the right, of course, to defend yourself.” 51 The following month, the Trial Chamber invited the Registrar to appoint amici
curiae, not to represent Milosevic but rather to ensure a fair trial and “assist [the Chamber] in the proper determination of the case.” 52 In order to
assist the Chamber to secure a fair trial, the amici were to bring “exculpatory or mitigating evidence” to the Trial Chamber’s attention, 53 to inform the Chamber of any defenses the Accused could properly raise, 54 to
“mak[e] submissions as to the relevance . . . of the NATO air campaign
in Kosovo,” 55 and to identify witnesses whom the Chamber could call. 56
The Chamber further enhanced the rights of the Accused in April 2002
by recognizing his right to communicate with legal advisers 57 and by
granting him privileged communication with named Legal Associates. 58

49. Written Note by the Accused, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-I, Registry pgs. 3371–72 (July 3, 2001) (confidential document on file with author).
50. Trial Tr. at 2806:2–3 (Apr. 10, 2002), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-0254-T, available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/020410IT.htm (Milosevic: “I cannot
appoint a lawyer, an attorney for myself, in front of an institution that I don’t recognise.”).
51. Id. at 1:19–20 (July 3, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/
010703IA.htm.
52. Id. at 7:5–15 (Aug. 30, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/
010830SC.htm; Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Order Inviting Designation
of
Amicus
Curiae
(Aug.
30,
2001),
available
at
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/10830AO516194.htm. Steven Kay QC,
Branislav Tapuskovic, and Mischa Wladimiroff were designated by the Registrar on September 6, 2001. Milosevic, Order Concerning the Provision of Documents to Amici Curiae (Sept. 19, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/ordere/10919DE516313.htm. The Accused was also permitted to discuss and supply them with
copies of documents subject to Trial Chamber Orders imposing non-disclosure to third
parties.
53. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Inviting Designation of
Amicus Curiae (Aug. 30, 2001).
54. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Concerning Amici Curiae
(Jan. 11, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/
20111AO517099.htm.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Prosecutor v Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order, para. 10 (Apr. 16, 2002).
58. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order, para. 14 (Apr. 16, 2002)
(permitting Milosevic to have privileged communication with lawyers Zdenko Tomanovic and Dragoslav Ognjanovic). Branko Rakic was later appointed as a third “Associate.”
Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 5 (Sept. 22, 2004) (citing Milosevic, Order Appointing Branko Rakic as Legal
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In response to a suggestion in 2001 from the Prosecution that defense
counsel should be assigned to the Accused alongside the Amici, the
Chamber reiterated that “the accused has a right to counsel, but he also
has a right not to have counsel.” 59 The Trial Chamber consistently upheld this position on the basis that “it would be wrong for the Chamber to
impose counsel on the accused, because that would be in breach of the
position under customary international law.” 60
1.3.1: Prosecution Phase
The Trial Chamber first expressed concern about the completion of the
trial in November 2002 in light of the state of the Accused’s ill health. 61
The Prosecution again sought to have defense counsel imposed on the
Accused on the basis that by proceeding pro se, the Accused had exacerbated his health problems. 62 This, the Prosecution suggested, created
“self-imposed” difficulties, dictated the scope of the trial, and obtained
for the Accused a trial that was “significantly less complete than it would
otherwise be.” 63
This submission was rejected in December 2002 64 and written reasons
were issued in April 2003. 65 The Trial Chamber reasoned that the “present circumstances” were not such that the tribunal could assign counsel

Associate
to
the
Accused
(Oct.
23,
2003)),
available
at
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/decision-e/040922.htm.
59. Trial Tr. at 18:3–4 (Aug. 30, 2001), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37PT, available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/010830SC.htm.
60. Id. at 18:9–11.
61. Id. at 12727:10–12 (Nov. 1, 2002) (Case No. IT-02-54-T), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/021101IT.htm.
62. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the
Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, para. 7 (Apr. 4, 2003) (citing
Milosevic, Submission from the Office of the Prosecutor on the Future Conduct of the
Case in the Light of the State of the Accused’s Health and the Length and Complexity of
the Case (Nov. 8, 2002); Milosevic, Observations by the Amici Curiae on the Imposition
of Defence Counsel on Accused (Nov. 18, 2002); Milosevic, Addendum to the Prosecution’s Response to the Confidential Observations by the Amici Curiae on the Health of
the Accused and the Future Conduct of the Trial (Nov. 20, 2002)).
63. Id. para. 10 (quoting Milosevic, Submission from the Office of the Prosecutor on
the Future Conduct of the Case in the Light of the State of the Accused’s Health and the
Length and Complexity of the Case, para. 4 (Nov. 8, 2002)).
64. Trial Tr. at 14574:14–17 (Dec. 18, 2002), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT02-54-T (“[D]efence counsel will not be imposed upon the accused against his wishes in
the present circumstances. It is not normally appropriate in adversarial proceedings such
as these. The Trial Chamber will keep the position under review.”).
65. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the
Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel (Apr. 4, 2003).
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contrary to the wishes of the accused. 66 It noted that the duty imposed by
Article 20(1) of the ICTY Statute to ensure a fair and expeditious trial
must be implemented “‘with full respect for the rights of the accused.’” 67
Crucially, however, the Trial Chamber stressed that “there may be circumstances . . . where it is in the interests of justice to appoint counsel,”
and resolved to “keep the position under review.” 68
1.3.2: Defense Phase
The ill health of the Accused began to cause more frequent disruption
as the Prosecution phase of the trial advanced. During the Prosecution’s
case, the trial was adjourned on several occasions for two to three weeks
or more to allow the Accused to recuperate. 69 Due to Milosevic’s high
blood pressure and heart condition, his trial was reduced to a three-day
week, and, further, to a four-hour day beginning September 2003. 70 In an
attempt to speed up proceedings, the Trial Chamber reduced the time

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. para. 18.
Id. para. 41.
Id. para. 40.
See, e.g., Milosevic Trial Delayed Again Due to High Blood Pressure, IRISH
TIMES, July 17, 2004, available at http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/world/
2004/0717/1605102285FR17MILOSEVIC.html (trial adjourned from mid-July 2004 to
August 31, 2004 due to the Accused’s high blood pressure); Milosevic Trial Put Off to
Give Him Rest, BIRMINGHAM POST (U.K.), Dec. 13, 2005, at 9 (trial adjourned “for six
weeks to give [Milosevic] more rest”); see also Marlise Simons, Milosevic Now Faces
Genocide Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2002, at A10 (noting the slowing of the trial’s
pace due to concerns about Milosevic’s health).
70. Pursuant to the Medical Report of Dr. van Dijkman of August 26, 2002, the Trial
Chamber mandated that four consecutive days of rest be given every two weeks of trial.
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of
Defence Counsel, para. 53 (Sept. 22, 2004) (citing Medical Report of Dr. van Dijkman,
Aug. 26, 2002). The trial continued as such until the end of September 2003 when, in
accordance with further medical recommendations (Id., citing Medical Report of Dr. van
Dijkman, Sept. 26, 2003), “the Trial Chamber decided to sit three days each week, to
allow the Accused sufficient time to rest.” Id. (citing Trial Tr. at 27063 (Sept. 30, 2003),
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T). From then on, the trial ran from 9a.m. to
1:45p.m. (with two fifteen minute intervals) three days per week.
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available to the Prosecution, 71 causing prosecutors to argue that “their
case [wa]s being ‘emasculated.’” 72
The Prosecution closed its case on February 25, 2004, 73 at which stage
sixty-six trial days had been lost. 74 The Prosecution’s case was interrupted on thirteen occasions on account of the Accused’s illness, eight of
which related exclusively to the Accused’s high blood pressure. 75 Between February and June 2004, doctors advised the Accused to rest for
fifty-one weekdays. 76 Due to Milosevic’s poor health, the Tribunal delayed the original starting date for the defense case, originally June 8,

71. Trial Tr. at 2784 (Apr. 10, 2002), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T
(“[W]e have decided that the Prosecution should have one year from today to conclude
their case. That will give them a total of 14 months in which to finish the case, their case.
In the view of the Trial Chamber, no Prosecution case should continue for a period longer
than that.”); see Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Request to Have Written Statements Admitted Under Rule 92bis, para. 27 (Mar.
21, 2002) (limiting the number of Prosecution witnesses).
72. Mirko Klarin, War Crimes Manipulation; Slobodan Milosevic’s Refusal to Accept
Help in His War Crimes Trial Is Making It Difficult to Provide Him a Fair Hearing,
LONDON FREE PRESS (Ontario, Can.), Aug. 24, 2002, at F4.
73. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Rescheduling and Setting
the Time Available to Present the Defence Case, para. 2 (Feb. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/040225.htm.
74. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order on Future Conduct of the
Trial, para. 6 (July 6, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/ordere/040706.htm.
75. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 56 n.120 (Sept. 22, 2004). Of the sixty-six trial days lost,
twenty-eight were in 2002, thirty-one in 2003, and seven in the first two months of 2004.
Id.
76. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Scheduling Order for a Hearing,
para. 11 (Nov. 22, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/ordere/051122.htm (citing “Report by the Registrar Pursuant to the Trial Chamber’s ‘Omnibus
Order on Matters Dealt with at the Pre-Defence Conference’, filed on 18 June 2004,”
para. 7 (June 25, 2004)). This total amount of days was based on a five-day working
week. Under a “three-day-per-week analysis,” the amount of days lost was thirty-one.
The Accused was found to have used the equivalent of eleven of these days in preparation of his case. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Appeal Against the
Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel: Corrigendum, para. 5
(Sept. 29, 2004) (referring to Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T,
“Report by the Registrar Pursuant to the Trial Chamber’s ‘Omnibus Order on Matters
Dealt with at the Pre-Defence Conference’, filed on 18 June 2004,” para. 7 (June 25,
2004)).
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2004, 77 on five occasions. 78 Milosevic’s health was progressively becoming a major obstacle to the expeditious completion of the case.
In July 2004, the Trial Chamber noted that on the basis of the time lost
due to the Accused’s recurring ill health, it was “necessary to carry out a
radical review of the future conduct of the trial.” 79 At this stage of the
trial, His Honor Judge May, who had been forced to resign due to ill
health (and who subsequently died), had been replaced. 80 Preemptively,
the Chamber suggested that “it may be necessary to assign counsel to the
Accused, and/or adopt other measures to ensure a fair and expeditious
conduct of the trial.” 81 It also noted “the resolve and determination of the
Trial Chamber to conclude the presentation of the defense case by October 2005.” 82 This was perhaps the first indication of concern with the
expeditious completion of the trial that, by the time of the Accused’s
death, had become unyielding. 83

77. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Rescheduling and Setting
the Time Available to Present the Defence Case, para. 10(5) (Feb. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/040225.htm.
78. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 59 (Sept. 22, 2004).
79. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order on Future Conduct of the
Trial, para. 15 (July 6, 2004).
80. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Pursuant to Rule 15 bis (D)
(Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/040329.htm
(deciding to continue the Milosevic proceedings with a substitute judge following Judge
May’s resignation caused by his illness).
81. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order on Future Conduct of the
Trial, para. 21 (July 6, 2004).
82. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Further Order on Future Conduct
of the Trial, para. 5 (July 19, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/
trialc/order-e/040719.htm. However, it later became apparent that the defense case would
proceed significantly beyond this time. Milosevic, Decision in Relation to Severance,
Extension of Time and Rest, para. 25 (Dec. 12, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/
icty/milosevic/trialc/decision-e/051212.htm (“The conclusion of the Accused’s allotted
time will take the trial well into March 2006. Once rebuttal and rejoinder cases are heard
and concluding arguments made, it is likely the trial hearings would still not conclude
until the middle of 2006. Judgement drafting will occupy a further substantial period.”).
83. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Order Recording
Use of Time in the Defence Case (Mar. 23, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/
icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/050323.htm; Milosevic, Order Recording Use of Time Used
in the Defence case (Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/
trialc/order-e/050301-2.htm; Milosevic, Order Concerning the Time Available to Present
the Defence Case (Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/
trialc/order-e/050210.htm (all concerning the limitation of time available to the Defense
by calculation).
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In an oral ruling on September 2, 2004, the Trial Chamber ordered the
assignment of defense counsel to the Accused. 84 Accordingly, Mr. Steven Kay QC and Ms. Gillian Higgins, who previously functioned as
Amici Curiae, were appointed to this role. The modalities of the assignment were outlined in an order issued on September 3, 85 according to
which it would be the role of the Assigned Counsel “to determine how to
present the case for the Accused.” 86 In particular, the Assigned Counsel
were to:
represent the Accused by preparing and examining those witnesses
court Assigned Counsel deem it appropriate to call;
make all submissions on fact and law that they deem it appropriate to
make;
seek from the Trial Chamber such orders as they consider necessary to
enable them to present the Accused’s case properly . . .; [and]
discuss with the Accused the conduct of the case, endeavour to obtain
his instructions thereon and take account of views expressed by the Accused, while retaining the right to determine what course to follow.87

Under this system, it was only with the leave of the Trial Chamber that
the Accused could “continue to participate actively in the conduct of his
case, including, where appropriate, examining witnesses, following examination by court Assigned Counsel.” 88 This order whipped the helm
from the hands of the Accused and installed the newly Assigned Counsel
in his place, giving them full control over the course of the defense strategy. As will be seen in Section Four, this disproportionate move stripped
the Accused of his dignity and autonomy. The rationale behind the decision was expounded upon in a written ruling issued on September 22,
2004. 89 On this occasion, the Chamber extracted a different conclusion
from an examination of much of the same jurisprudence upon which it

84. It should be noted that this Article will adopt the term “assignment” as used by
the Tribunal. This will avoid the negative connotations of the term “imposition” which is
often used in relation to this case.
85. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order on the Modalities to be
Followed by Court Assigned Counsel, (Sept. 3, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/
icty/milosevic/trialc/order-e/040903.htm.
86. Id. para. 6(1).
87. Id. para. 6(1)(a)–(d). The Tribunal also instructed the Assigned Counsel to “act
throughout in the best interests of the Accused.” Id. para. 6(1)(e).
88. Id. para. 6(2).
89. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel (Sept. 22, 2004).
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had based its April 2003 ruling. This conclusion is debated in Section
Three.
Following the Accused’s oral instigation, the Assigned Counsel
lodged an appeal against the assignment that was rejected by the Appeals
Chamber in November 2004. 90 The Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial
Chamber’s exercise of discretion. 91 Crucially, however, the Appeals
Chamber instructed the Trial Chamber to radically alter the modalities to
be followed by the Assigned Counsel, according a far greater role to the
Accused. 92 This decision essentially reinstated Milosevic as “captain of
the ship.” 93 The significance of this judgment is expounded in Section
Four. The Trial Chamber, in December 2004, refused the Assigned
Counsel’s motion to withdraw, 94 and refused leave to appeal this decision. 95 The Registrar’s ensuing refusal to allow the Assigned Counsel to
withdraw was reaffirmed by the ICTY President in February 2005. 96 The
Assigned Counsel continued, therefore, to function alongside the accused
until the trial was terminated in March 2006.
1.3.3: Why Such Haste?
There is, at present, an unconcealed push for a degree of finality to
proceedings in The Hague. The Tribunal “was established as a temporary
tribunal with a finite mission.” 97 While this was not clearly articulated in
the ICTY Statute, it is clear that this was the assumption implied by the
Report of the Secretary General upon the establishment of the Tribunal,
whereby “the life span of the international tribunal would be linked to the
restoration and maintenance of international peace and security in the
90. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defence Counsel (Nov. 1,
2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/decision-e/041101.htm.
91. Id. paras. 15, 19.
92. Id. para. 19.
93. Id.
94. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel’s
Motion for Withdrawal (Dec. 7, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/
trialc/decision-e/041207.htm.
95. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel
Request for Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal Against the Decision on Assigned
Counsel Motion for Withdrawal (Dec. 17, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/
milosevic/trialc/decision-e/041217-3.htm.
96. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision Affirming the Registrar’s
Denial of Assigned Counsel’s Application to Withdraw (Feb. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/decision-e/050207e.htm.
97. Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and Its Completion Strategy: Efforts to
Achieve Accountability for War Crimes and Their Tribunals, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 82, 84
(2005).
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territory of the former Yugoslavia, and Security Council decisions related thereto.” 98 Thus, “concerns have been voiced not only by United
Nations officials, Member States and others, but also by all the organs of
the Tribunals with regard to the slowness of the pace of proceedings, the
associated length of detention of accused, [and] the length and cost of
Tribunal operations . . . .” 99
With proceedings remaining “exceptionally lengthy, costly, and complicated,” 100 ambitious strategies had been adopted by the U.N. Security
Council with a view to hastening the pace of progress. 101 The ICTY envisaged the completion of “investigations by 2004 . . . first instance trials
by 2008,” 102 and all work in 2010. 103 These target deadlines have created
a palpable concern with the Tribunal’s swift administration of justice, a
concern which clearly manifested itself in the Milosevic case.

98. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2
of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), para. 28, delivered to the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
99. U.N. Gen. Assembly, Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the
Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, para. 35, U.N. Doc.
A/54/634 (Nov. 22, 1999); see also Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness:
Counseling the Accused in Rwanda’s Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 545, 623 (1998) (“Th[e ICTR’s] slowness is perceived as foot-dragging by many
Rwandans.”); Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, Justice by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 37 STAN. J INT’L L. 255, 309 (2001) (noting that in a survey of
war victims, the Tribunal’s slow pace emerged as one of the more frequent objections to
the ICTY); Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in
International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 321, 368 (1999) (footnote omitted)
(“Th[e ICTY’s] pace is counterproductive to accountability goals, which often focus on
the swiftness . . . of punishment.”); James Blount Griffin, Note, A Predictive Framework
for the Effectiveness of International Criminal Tribunals, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
405, 432 (2001) (describing the ICTR to be “too slow for the demands of justice”).
100. Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of
International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 90 (2002).
101. See S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (Dec. 5, 2000); S.C. Res. 1503, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); see also President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Report on the Operation of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, presented to the Secretary-General (May 12, 2000),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/RAP000620e.htm.
102. President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Report on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National Courts, para. 1, delivered to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2002/678 (June 19, 2002).
103. Id. para. 75.
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SECTION TWO: BALANCING RIGHTS
What emerged in the Milosevic conflict between self-representation
and the principle of a speedy trial was a balancing test between the personal rights of the Accused and the interest of the tribunal in achieving a
fair and expeditious trial. The Tribunal ultimately found that the efficient
administration of justice to prevail in light of the overarching need to
secure a fair trial. This decision confirms that self-representation is not
an institutional component of the adversary process, but rather a privilege that can be withdrawn in certain circumstances in the interests of
fairness and expedition. This section examines the legitimacy of that
claim.
2.1: Overarching Right to Fair Trial
In its decision to assign counsel, the Milosevic Trial Chamber found
that “[t]he minimum guarantees set out in Article 21(4) of the Statute are
elements of the overarching requirement of a fair trial.” 104 Essentially,
the Trial Chamber subsumed the right to represent oneself in person into
a single “right to a defense,” which in turn forms just one of several elements in the “overarching” right to a fair trial.
In accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 105
the Trial Chamber found that “when read in light of the object and purpose of securing [the] . . . right to a . . . fair trial,” the right to represent
oneself under Article 21(4)(d) “may be lost if the effect of its exercise is
to obstruct the achievement of that object and purpose.” 106 Thus, as articulated by Justice Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court in Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, “[w]hat were contrived as protections for
the accused should not be turned into fetters.” 107
This reasoning was heavily inspired by the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR, which considers all minimum rights included in Article 6(3) of
the ECHR in the context of the overall purpose of bringing about a fair

104. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 32 (Sept. 22, 2004).
105. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), done May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. In the early days of the work of the
ICTY, the Tribunal decided that it was permissible to interpret the ICTY Statute using
treaty interpretation principles similar to that found in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, para. 282 (July 15, 1999),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf.
106. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 34 (Sept. 22, 2004).
107. 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942).
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trial. 108 Under this premise, the list of minimum guarantees set out in
Article 6(3) of the ECHR (substantially equivalent to Article 21(4) of the
ICTY Statute) reflects aspects of the notion of a fair trial. 109 Article
21(4)(d) is not, therefore, simply a list of unconnected guarantees, but
rather “a compact statement of the rights necessary to a full defense” 110
which must be considered in the broader context of the right to a fair

108. See, e.g., Meftah v. France, 2002-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 265, 282–83 para. 40, available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=
html&highlight=Meftah%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20France&sessionid=11521945&skin
=hudoc-en (“[T]he guarantees contained in paragraph 3 of Article 6 are specific aspects
of the general concept of a fair trial set forth in paragraph 1.”); Correia de Mateos v. Portugal,
2001-XII
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
161,
para.
31,
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=1132746FF1FE2
A468ACCBCD1763D4D8149&key=24119&sessionId=8129673&skin=hudocen&attachment=true (“The Court will examine the applicant’s complaint in accordance
with the general rule set out in paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the Convention, while bearing
in mind the requirements of paragraph 3(c) of that Article, which constitute particular
aspects of the right to a fair trial, guaranteed by paragraph 1.” (citation omitted)); X. v.
Norway, App. No. 5923/72, 3 Eur. Comm’n. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 43, 44 (1975).
109. See, e.g., Foucher v. France (No. 33), 1997-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 452, 464 para. 30,
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Foucher%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20France&sessionid=11521945
&skin=hudoc-en; Delta v. France, 191 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, 15 para. 34 (1990), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&
highlight=Delta%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20France&sessionid=11522061&skin=hudocen; Granger v. United Kingdom, 174 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17, para. 43 (1990), available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=
F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=205&sessionId=11522061&skin=h
udoc-en&attachment=true; Unterpertinger v. Austria, 110 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para.
29 (1986), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=
open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=169&sessionId=11522
046&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true (“[T]he guarantees contained in paragraph 3 (art.
6-3) are specific aspects of the general concept of a fair trial set forth in paragraph 1 (art.
6-1) . . . .”); see also Vacher v. France (No. 25), 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2138, 2147 para.
22
(1996),
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1
&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Vacher%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20France&se
ssionid=11522061&skin=hudoc-en Melin v. France, 261 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, 11
para. 21 (1993), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&
portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=12914/87&sessionid=11520930&skin=hudoc-en
(both stating that “the requirements of paragraph 3 (b) and (c) of Article 6 of the Convention . . . constitute specific aspects of the right to a fair trial”).
110. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975). Faretta makes this statement with
regard to the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; the rights guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment and Article 21(4) of the ICTY Statute are substantially similar. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI with ICTY Statute art. 21(4), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192.
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trial. 111 Self-representation is simply a means through which this right
can be secured. 112 Recent jurisprudence of the HRC, 113 ECtHR, 114 and
ICTY 115 support this premise, as does the U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Faretta. 116
2.2: Fair and Expeditious Trial
Under Article 21(4)(c) of the ICTY Statute, the accused has the right to
be tried “without undue delay.” 117 Moreover, trial chambers have a duty,
inter alia, to ensure a “fair and expeditious” trial under Article 20(1). 118

111. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 32 (Sept. 22, 2004).
112. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Prosecution Response to
“Assigned Counsel Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel” and to “Defence Reply to ‘Prosecution Motion to Strike Ground of Appeal (3) from Assigned Counsel “Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel,’”” para. 25 (Oct. 11, 2004) available at
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/motion/041011response.htm.
113. Torregrosa Lafuente v. Spain, Comm’n No. 866/1999, para. 6.3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/72/D/866/1999 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
(Symbol)/3e076e74aeabef56c1256ada002edafb?Opendocument (finding that a Spanish
law requiring a litigant before the Constitutional Court to be represented by counsel did
not violate Article 14(1) of the ICCPR).
114. See, e.g., Correia de Matos v. Portugal, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 161.
115. Prosecutor v. Seselj, IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with His Defence, paras. 20–21 (May 9,
2003), available at http://www.un.org/icty/seselj/trialc/decision-e/030509.htm; Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Alternative Request for Renewed
Consideration of Delalic’s Motion for an Adjournment Until 22 June or Request for Issue
of Subpoenas to Individuals and Requests for Assistance to the Government of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, para. 44 (June 22, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/
trialc2/decision-e/80622MS25747.htm (stating that the exercise of the rights enjoyed by
the accused “is not absolute” and “is subject to the control of the Trial Chamber to ensure
a fair and expeditious trial in the interests of justice”).
116. Hybrid Defense, supra note 26, at 351.
117. ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 21(4)(c) (emphasis added); see also ICTR Statute, supra note 13, art. 20(4)(c); Statute of the SCSL, supra note 14, art. 17(4)(c); Rome
Statute, supra note 15, art. 67(1)(c); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm.
on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, The Administration of Justice and
the Human Rights of Detainees: The Right to a Fair Trial: Current Recognition and
Measures Necessary for its Strengthening, Annex II: Draft Body of Principles on the
Right to a Fair Trial and a Remedy, para. 54, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/24 (June 3,
1994) (prepared by Stanislav Chernichenko & William Treat).
118. ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 20(1) (emphasis added); see also ICTR Statute,
supra note 13, art. 19(1) (“The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused . . . .”); Rules of Procedure and
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Article 20(1) does not simply concern the accused, but rather imposes a
positive duty on the trial chamber in the public interest. 119 The commonly cited principle of speedy trial refers to a combination of these
three guarantees, and entails consideration of a diverse range of interests.
The trial chambers must, therefore, in balancing various rights with the
principle of a fair and expeditious trial, have due regard for interests
other than those of the accused.
2.2.1: In Whose Interest Is a Speedy Trial?
It is primarily the accused who has an interest in a speedy trial. Prompt
trials go some way to ensuring that the defendant can mount an effective
defense. Speedy trials are primarily designed “(i) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” 120 Prompt trials ensure that witnesses’ memories do not fade 121
and evidence is not destroyed nor disappears. 122 The limitation of pretrial
detention is particularly important at the Yugoslavia Tribunal, where
many defendants are held for lengthy periods before trial due to, inter
alia, the Tribunal’s overwhelming caseload. 123
The interests of the Prosecution, victims, and witnesses must also be
considered, 124 along with those of unrelated defendants awaiting trial 125
Evidence of the SCSL, Rule 26 bis (as amended Mar. 7, 2003) (similar language); Rome
Statute, supra note 15, art. 64(2) (similar language).
119. ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 20(1) (“The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a
trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the
rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due
regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.” (emphasis added)).
120. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972) (footnote omitted); see also Amnesty
Int’l, Fair Trials Manual, ch. 19.1, AI Index: POL 30/002/98, Dec. 1, 1998.
121. See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, para. 105,
(Nov. 3, 1999) (quoting unidentified source).
122. Akhil Reed Amar, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 90 (1997) (“[I]f government holds the accused in extended pretrial detention,
courts must ensure that the accuracy of the trial itself will not thereby be undermined—as
might occur if an innocent defendant’s prolonged detention itself causes the loss of key
exculpatory evidence.”).
123. Patrick L. Robinson, Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 11 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 569, 585 (2000).
124. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, para. 55 (Aug. 10, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/100895pm.htm (“A fair trial
means not only fair treatment to the defendant but also to the prosecution and to the witnesses.”); see also Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292, 335 (Deane, J.) (Austl.)
(stating that “‘the interests of the Crown acting on behalf of the community’” must be
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and the international community. 126 In an enlightening dissent in Milosevic, Judge Shahabuddeen posited that:
The fairness of a trial is the result of the fairness of the system of justice employed. The latter depends on the striking of a balance between
two competing public interests. First, there is the justly publicized public interest in respecting the rights of the accused. Second, there is the
less proclaimed but equal public interest in ensuring that crimes are
properly investigated and duly prosecuted. 127

It was recognized in Milosevic that “the Tribunal has its own distinct
set of interests at stake in this case, including first and foremost the interest in an outcome that is just, accurate, and reasonably expeditious.” 128
This premise has consistently been reiterated by the Trial Chamber 129

considered in “determining the practical content” of the right to a fair trial (quoting Barton v. The Queen (1980) 147 C.L.R. 75, 101 (Austl.) (Gibbs, A.C.J. & Mason, J.))).
125. Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, Decision in the Matter of
Proceedings Under Rule 15 bis (D), para. 33(g) (July 15, 2003).
126. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1 (Appeals Chamber), Decision on
Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissiblity of Evidence, para. 25 (Feb. 16, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/appeal/decision-e/90216EV36313.htm (“[T]he Prosecution acts on behalf of and in the interests of the community, including the interests of
the victims of the offence charged (in cases before the Tribunal the Prosecutor acts on
behalf of the international community).”).
127. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.2, Decision on Admissibility
of Prosecution Investigator’s Evidence, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 36 (Sept. 30, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/
decision-e/020930par.htm.htm.
128. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision Affirming the Registrar’s
Denial of Assigned Counsel’s Application to Withdraw, para. 11 (Feb. 7, 2005) (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added); see also Milosevic, Trial Tr. at 32358:12–19 (Sept. 2, 2004),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/040902IT.htm (“The fundamental duty of
the Trial Chamber is to ensure that the trial is fair and expeditious.”).
129. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Request by Accused
Mucic for Assignment of New Counsel, para. 3 (June 24, 1996), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/decision-e/60624DS2.htm
(emphasizing
the
“overriding interest of the administration of justice” and that the Tribunal had to “be satisfied that the reasons [for the defendant’s dissatisfaction with assigned counsel] are
genuine and that the request [for assignment of new counsel] is not being made for frivolous reasons or in a desire to pervert the course of justice, e.g., by causing additional delay”); Prosecutor v. Seselj, IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with His Defence, para. 21 (May 9, 2003).
The Seselj Tribunal also stated that “the right to a fair trial . . . is not only a fundamental
right of the Accused, but also a fundamental interest of the Tribunal related to its own
legitimacy.” Id.
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and the Appeals Chamber, 130 by other tribunals, 131 and in national jurisdictions. 132 In sum, the Tribunal has a legitimate interest in ensuring that
justice is being done and seen to be done.
2.2.2: The Fair Trial Rights of the Accused Remain Paramount
While the principle of a speedy trial necessarily encompasses diverse
interests, it is particularly instructive that under Article 20(1) of the
ICTY Statute a fair and expeditious trial must be achieved “with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of
victims and witnesses.” 133 This formulation suggests that the interests of
the accused must be given precedence. A further indication of the primacy of the interests of the accused is found in the assertion made in the
ICTR case Kanyabashi that the “object and purpose” of the ICTR Statute
is to secure for the accused “a fair and expeditious trial.” 134 According to
Falvey, “[t]he protection of victims and witnesses, although a laudable
goal, must yield to the right to a fair trial when the two conflict.” 135

130. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 19
(Nov. 1, 2004) (noting “the Tribunal’s basic interest in a reasonably expeditious resolution of the cases before it”).
131. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on the Application
of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of
the Special Court, para. 26 (June 8, 2004) (considering “the public interest, national and
international, in the expeditious completion of the trial” in determining whether to allow
the accused to represent himself).
132. It has, for instance, consistently been reaffirmed by the High Court of Australia
that when “determining the practical content” of the right to a fair trial, “‘regard must be
had to the interests of the Crown acting on behalf of the community as well as to the interests of the accused.’” Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292, 335 (Deane, J.)
(quoting Barton v. The Queen (1980) 147 C.L.R. 75, 101 (Austl.) (Gibbs, A.C.J. & Mason, J.)). Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court felt that the right of a defendant to be present
at trial must be held to be subordinate to the overriding need to maintain orderly and dignified proceedings, which is “essential to the proper administration of criminal justice.”
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
133. ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 20(1) (emphasis added).
134. Kanyabashi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-15-A, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on the Jurisdiction of Trial Chamber I, Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, para. 16 (June 3, 1999).
135. Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., United Nations Justice or Military Justice: Which is the
Oxymoron? An Analysis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 475, 487 (1995). Mr. Falvey
assisted in the drafting of the rules of evidence and procedure proposed by the United
States for the ICTY. Id. at 475; see also Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR97-21-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Joinder of Trials, para. 16 (Oct. 5,
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The ECtHR has held that Article 6(1) of the ECHR, equivalent to Article 20(1) of the ICTY Statute, “is intended above all to secure the interests of the defence and those of the proper administration of justice.” 136
Furthermore, the ECtHR has held that “[t]he right to a fair administration
of justice . . . cannot be sacrificed to expediency.” 137 Hence, the safeguards accorded to the accused should not be excessively curtailed in the
interest of achieving a speedy conclusion at trial.
The ICTY Rules provide little guidance on which rights take precedence in the event of a conflict between them. This problem will become
more pronounced, given the elevated status of victims and witnesses in
the Rome Statute 138 and recent pronouncements of the ECtHR that appear to accord new rights to victims. 139 It is instructive that Article 68(1)
of the Rome Statute dictates that measures taken to protect victims and
witnesses “shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the
accused or a fair and impartial trial.” 140 This formulation again appears
to give precedence to the rights of the accused. These authorities must be
given due weight in the balancing of rights.
The Trial Chamber’s original approach of allowing Milosevic to proceed pro se indisputably exacerbated the already lengthy nature of that
trial. 141 In response, the Chamber had to balance the pro se right of the
accused with its own statutory duty to secure a fair and expeditious trial.
The following section will address the manner in which the Chamber
balanced these rights. It is not denied that the Chamber indeed had a
genuine and legitimate interest in curtailing the pro se right of the Accused. Rather, it is argued that the Chamber erred in the principles employed to achieve this goal.

1999) (“[T]he need to protect victims and witnesses . . . cannot be entirely subordinated
to the rights of the accused.”).
136. Acquaviva v. France, 333 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 17, para. 66 (1996) (emphasis
added).
137. Kostovski v. Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 21, para. 44 (1989).
138. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 68 (containing provisions for the protection of victims and witnesses).
139. See, e.g., M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 37–38, paras. 177–78. Here,
the ECtHR appears to accord a right of a (rape) victim to compel investigators and prosecutors to confront witnesses in order to assess the credibility of conflicting evidence.
140. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 68(1); see also id. art. 68(3), 68(5) (containing
same provision with respect to specific protective measures).
141. It is important to note that a trial’s length depends on many factors, “including the
scope of the indictment, the breadth of the dispute between the parties and the complexity
of the facts.” Richard May & Marieke Wierda, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 279
(2002).
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SECTION THREE: MILOSEVIC AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL
As demonstrated by the foregoing, it has been clearly established that
adjudicative bodies have the power to restrict the right to selfrepresentation in the interest of the fair and expeditious administration of
justice. Upon this foundation, it is widely accepted that a defendant’s pro
se right may be restricted in the case of deliberate trial disruption, to
which the author will refer as “obstructionism.” This principle is based
on the rationale that self-representation may not be used as a tactic to
delay the trial. By necessity, the employment of tactics implies the existence of resolve, volition, and intention. Thus, the concept of obstructionism may be said to relate solely to the willful conduct of the accused deliberately aimed at the disruption of trial proceedings. It follows that this
concept does not encompass disruption caused by unintended or extraneous factors.
Controversially, the Trial Chamber ruled in Milosevic that “[t]here is
no difference in principle between deliberate misconduct which disrupts
the proceedings and any other circumstance which so disrupts the proceedings as to threaten the integrity of the trial.” 142 This reasoning effectively led to the conclusion that delays accruing due to the Accused’s ill
health had the same potential as a defendant’s deliberately obstructionist
actions to damage the integrity of proceedings. In other words, the damage that disruption causes to the integrity of a trial will be the same regardless of the cause or purpose of that disruption. This assertion will be
challenged in this section.
It is contended that while the recurring ill health of Milosevic undeniably inhibited the expeditious completion of the trial, it cannot be said to
have undermined the integrity of proceedings. Ill health must be differentiated from deliberate obstructionist behavior. The following section outlines why the decision to assign counsel could not defensibly have been
based on the principle of obstructionism, thereby leading the Trial
Chamber to avoid this rubric, and to create an entirely new and unfounded premise in law in order to fulfill the aims of the completion
strategy.
3.1: Intentional Disruption: “Obstructionism”
The concept of obstructionism is derived from the fact that the “pro se
right is circumscribed by the requirement that the defendant not disregard

142. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 33 (Sept. 22, 2004).
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the dignity, order and decorum of judicial proceedings.” 143 In the seminal
case of Faretta v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that
the right to proceed pro se may be denied where the defendant deliberately undertakes to hinder the trial’s orderly conduct by engaging in obstreperous behavior. 144 This was based on the premise that the right to
self-representation was not intended as a license either “to abuse the dignity of the courtroom” 145 or to ignore either the rules of procedure or
substantive law. 146 This case clearly sought to regulate voluntary misconduct specifically designed to interrupt proceedings. 147 Nowhere does
Faretta imply that a defendant may lose his pro se right if he unintentionally consumes too much time in exercising it.
It is imperative that international legal proceedings are seen to be conducted efficiently, and with dignity and decorum. 148 In other words, “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” 149 Disruptions, particularly
where intentional, inevitably damage the public perception of the Tribunal. Accordingly, “the interest of a court in stopping disruption of its

143. Memorandum of Law Regarding Defendant’s Motion to Proceed Pro Se and
Status of Counsel at 11 n.19, United States v. Moussaoui, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11135
(E.D.
Va.
2002)
(No.
01-455-A)
(citations
omitted),
available
at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/65824/0.pdf
144. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (“[T]he trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.” (citation omitted)).
145. Id.
146. Id.; see also Ramirez Ferrel v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 576 P.2d
93, 95 (Cal. 1978) (noting that, as supported by Faretta, “an accused should only be deprived of th[e] right [of self-representation] when he engages in disruptive in-court conduct which is inconsistent with its proper exercise”).
147. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (“[T]he right [to self-representation] does not
exist . . . to be used as a tactic for . . . disruption . . . .”); see also United States v. Egwaoje, 335 F.3d 579, 586 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the fact that the accused “engaged in a pattern of obfuscation and obstructionism” supported the “knowing and intelligent” nature of his waiver of the right to counsel). The connotations of the word “obfuscation” in this context clearly indicate that the conduct to which the exception applies
involves control and resolve. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970); Commonwealth v. Africa, 353 A.2d 855, 864 (Pa. 1976).
148. See Memorandum of Law Regarding Defendant’s Motion to Proceed Pro Se and
Status of Counsel at 11 n.19, United States v. Moussaoui, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11135
(E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 01-455-A) (“[T]he defendant’s pro se right is circumscribed by the
requirement that the defendant does not disregard the dignity, order and decorum of judicial proceedings.” (citations omitted)).
149. Offutt v. U.S. 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
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proceedings, and the consequent threat to the integrity of the trial, is a
component of the overarching right to a fair trial.” 150
In Seselj, the Tribunal advanced the “legitimate interest in ensuring
that the trial proceeds in a timely manner without interruptions, adjournments or disruptions” to justify the assignment of standby counsel. 151
This interest was reaffirmed in Delalic. 152 In Prlic, the Tribunal stated
that “it is the duty of the Trial Chamber to make sure that the proceedings would not be halted by foreseeable, and therefore avoidable,
risks.” 153 Likewise, in the SCSL case of Norman, the great potential for
further disruption to the court’s timetable and calendar was among the
factors the court considered relevant to the curtailment of the right to
self-representation. 154
Furthermore, in Croissant v. Germany, the ECtHR found that “avoiding interruptions or adjournments corresponds to an interest of justice
which is relevant in the present context and may well justify an appointment against the accused’s wishes.” 155 This principle is also recognized
by U.S. courts which have denied applications “to proceed pro se be150. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Prosecution Response to
“Assigned Counsel Appeal Against Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defence Counsel” and “Defence Reply to “Prosecution Motion to Strike Ground of Appeal
(3) from Assigned Counsel “Appeal Against Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defence Counsel,”’” n.98 (Oct. 11, 2004).
151. Prosecutor v. Seselj, IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with His Defence, para. 21 (May 9, 2003).
152. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Alternative Request
for Renewed Consideration of Delalic’s Motion for an Adjournment Until 22 June or
Request for Issue of Subpoenas to Individuals and Requests for Assistance to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, paras. 44–45 (June 22, 1998) (noting that the exercise of the rights contained in Article 21(4) “is subject to the control of the Trial Chamber
to ensure a fair and expeditious trial in the interests of justice” and declaring that “the
Trial Chamber is, in the interests of expeditious and fair trial, empowered to order the
accused to close his case”).
153. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Case No. IT-04-74-PT, Decision on Requests for Appointment of Counsel, para. 31 (July 30, 2004) (citing Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Case No.
IT-01-47-PT, Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion for Review of the Decision of the
Registrar to Assign Mr. Rodney Dixon as Co-Counsel to the Accused Kubura, para. 44–
45 (Mar. 26, 2002),(noting that “the Chamber cannot wait until foreseeable harm is done
to the proceedings. It is for the Chamber to prevent such foreseeable harm.”)).
154. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on the Application of
Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation Under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of
the Special Court, paras. 15–16 (June 8, 2004). The SCSL further considered that the
Trial Chamber has a special interest in “protect[ing] the integrity of [its] proceedings”
and “ensur[ing] that the administration of justice is not brought into disrepute.” Id. para.
28.
155. Croissant v. F.R.G., 237 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 20, para. 28 (1992).
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cause of concern for orderly process.” 156 Further justifications for denying a pro se request have included “the need to ‘minimize disruptions, to
avoid inconvenience and delay, [and] to maintain continuity.’” 157
3.1.1: The Willful Nature of Obstructionism
An ICTY Trial Chamber in Delalic confirmed the willful nature of obstructionism, noting that self-representation may be curtailed where an
accused “unreasonably and unilaterally chooses his own dates in such a
manner as to prejudicially affect the course of the proceedings and cause
delay in respect of the defence of other accused persons.” 158 This conclusion was primarily inspired by the possibility that “an accused . . . may
by devious reasons relying on Article 21(4)(e) prolong the trial unnecessarily.” 159 As in Faretta, the rationale underpinning this decision pertains
solely to voluntary misconduct.
In a dissenting opinion in Seselj, Judge Antonetti stated that a mere intention to obstruct proceedings is insufficient to justify the curtailment of
the right to self-representation. 160 In order to warrant the appointment of
counsel, the Tribunal must demonstrate deliberately obstructionist behavior 161 or indisputably extreme conduct by the defendant which, by its

156. Colquitt, supra note 36, at 64 (citing Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010
(2d Cir. 1976); People v. Anderson, 247 N.W.2d 857, 860 (Mich. 1976)).
157. Id. at 65 (quoting United States v. Dunlap, 577 F.2d 867, 868 (4th Cir. 1978)); see
also Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 161–62 (2000) (“[T]he government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the
defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.”).
158. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Alternative Request
for Renewed Consideration of Delalic’s Motion for an Adjournment Until 22 June or
Request for Issue of Subpoenas to Individuals and Requests for Assistance to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, para. 45 (June 22, 1998).
159. Id. Based on these reasons, the Delalic Tribunal ordered the pro se Accused to
close his case. Id. para. 48.
160. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on the Accused’s Motion to
Re-Examine the Decision to Assign Standby Counsel, Opinion Dissidente du Judge Antonetti [Dissenting Opinion of Judge Antonetti], para. 10 (Mar. 1, 2005) (“La Chambre ne
peut pas . . . limiter le droit de l’Accusé à assurer personnellement sa défense en se fondant sur des « intentions » obstructionnistes.” [“The Chamber may not limit . . . the right
of the Defendant to personally ensure his defense because it is based on obstructionist
intentions.” ] (translation by Brooklyn Journal of International Law)).
161. Id. (noting that the Tribunal “a le devoir de démontrer que le comportement de
l’accusé est constitutif d’une faute témoignant d’un comportement délibérément grave et
obstructionniste” [“has the duty to show that the behavior of the defendant constitutes an
offense demonstrating deliberately serious and obstructionist conduct”] (translation by
Brooklyn Journal of International Law)).
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very nature, encumbers the administration of justice. 162 Clearly, therefore, in order to constitute obstructionism, disruption must be derived
from voluntary misconduct.
The Appeals Chamber in Milosevic found it “particularly instructive” 163 to consider the right of an accused “to be tried in his [own] presence.” 164 Rule 80(B) of the ICTY Rules allows a Trial Chamber to “order the removal of an accused from the courtroom and continue the proceedings in the absence of the accused if the accused has persisted in disruptive conduct.” 165 Here, again, it is voluntary misconduct which triggers the curtailment of the minimum guarantees set out in Article
21(4)(d).
3.1.2: Was Milosevic an Obstructionist?
The Milosevic Trial Chamber explicitly acknowledged that the Accused’s conduct at trial did not constitute obstructionism. 166 The Prosecution also overtly accepted this fact. 167 In order to understand Milosevic’s conduct, it is first necessary to comprehend his defense strategy.
Milosevic clearly viewed himself as a “political” defendant, attempting
to convert his trial into a trial of NATO and the Clinton Administration,
which, he claimed, cooperated with “terrorists” in Kosovo in 1999.168

162. Id. (noting that the Tribunal must establish “un comportement manifestement
excessif de nature à entraver la bonne administration de la justice” [“conduct so manifestly excessive the nature of which is likely to hinder the proper administration of justice”] (translation by Brooklyn Journal of International Law)).
163. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 13
(Nov. 1, 2004).
164. Id.; see ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 21(4)(d).
165. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia rule 80(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 37 (1996), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/IT032Rev37e.pdf.
166. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Reasons for Decision on the Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, para. 40 (Apr. 4, 2003).
167. Prosecutor v. Seselj, IT-03-67-PT, Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing
Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, at para. 11 (Feb. 28, 2003) (“As a
former head of state, the accused Milosevic does not need to be disruptive, obstructionist
or scandalous in order to remain in the public’s eye. Therefore, despite his rejection of
the Tribunal and its authority as such, to date the accused Milosevic has, to a large extent,
taken part in the proceedings in an orderly fashion.”) (on file with the author).
168. Sophia Piliouras, U.N. Report, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and Milosevic’s Trial, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 515, 520–21 (2002) (alleging, inter alia, that the United States provided “close air support to the Kosovo Liberation Army and other Albanian ‘terrorists’ and their foreign Islamic allies,” that NATO
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Among other allegations, 169 Milosevic accused the ICTY of “victor’s
justice.” 170 Milosevic claimed that the Tribunal yields to the objectives
of the U.S. and other NATO powers, 171 countries without whose financial and military support the tribunal could not function. 172 Essentially,
he chose self-representation as the most effective means of defending the
actions of the Serbian nation and his own political record.
Commentators have noted that Milosevic was derisive on certain occasions during the trial proceedings. 173 This, however, is inherent in the
primarily adversarial nature of the trial proceedings. It also ignores the
sensitive manner in which the Accused dealt with alleged victims of sexual assault. Accusations that the Accused refused to focus on material
considered relevant to the indictment 174 fail to examine the role of the
Trial Chamber in regulating the presentation of the evidence, and the
efforts of the Accused to present indictment-relevant evidence, particularly relating to Kosovo, during the Defense stage.
Although the Accused did not personally file written submissions and
at times failed to state his position on procedural points, 175 he effectively
acted “as an ‘unlawful aggressor,’” and that certain officials of NATO countries were
involved in “a ‘joint criminal enterprise’ against Yugoslavia and Serbia”).
169. Among other factors challenged by Milosevic were the composition of the bench,
the manner of his surrender to the Tribunal, the timing of his indictment, and the unfairness of procedures at the Tribunal. Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial,
37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 915, 923–30 (2003).
170. See Gary J. Bass, Why Not Victor’s Justice?, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2002, at A33.
171. See id.
172. See, e.g., Madeleine K. Albright, We Won’t Let War Criminals Walk; With or
Without a Balkan Peace Deal, the U.S. Won’t Relent, WASH. POST, Nov. 19 1995, at C01
(noting that the U.S. had given “more than $13 million in direct contributions and assessments” to the Tribunal).
173. See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 169, at 919 (“In addition to regularly making disparaging remarks about the court and repeatedly brow-beating witnesses, Milosevic pontificate[d] at length during cross examination of every prosecution witness.”).
174. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 3264:15–17 (Apr. 17, 2002), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case
No. IT-02-54-T, available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/020417IT.htm (May, J.)
(“It is an abuse of the process for you to make speeches, Mr. Milosevic, at this stage. It’s
also an abuse to go over the same ground.”); id. at 6208:8–10 (June 4, 2002), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/020604ED.htm (May, J.) (“A great deal of time is taken
up with repetition and argument and sometimes irrelevancies.”).
175. See, e.g., id. at 32078:3–4 (Mar. 25, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/
transe54/040325MH.htm (Milosevic: “Of course I have no intention of declaring my
views on your administrative issues.”); id. at 32078:9–13 (Meron, J.) (“I am assuming
that I should derive the conclusion from your comment that you do not wish to grant a
consent to the continuation of the hearings as I cannot understand the comment you have
made as amounting to a clear and unequivocal consent to continue the proceedings with a
substitute Judge.”).
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waived his right to file by implicitly accepting the work of Assigned
Counsel. The Accused essentially prompted them to make such submissions on his behalf through oral submissions at trial. 176 He went so far as
to explicitly acknowledge the dedication and commitment of Assigned
Counsel. 177 However, it is evident from the litigation concerning provisional release that he gave explicit and direct instructions to Assigned
Counsel from December 2005 to the time of his death. 178 Furthermore,
Milosevic “fully engaged in the cross-examination of Prosecution witnesses” 179 and presented consecutive witnesses in his defense, 180 thereby
actively partaking in trial proceedings.
3.1.3: Threshold of Obstructionist Conduct
The high threshold that a defendant’s conduct must breach in order to
constitute obstructionism is manifest from the ICTR case of Barayagwiza. 181 The Accused, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, declared the Rwanda
Tribunal to be “so dependent on the dictatorial anti-Hutu regime of Kigali” that it could not render “independent and impartial justice.” 182 He
176. E.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel Request for Provisional Release, para. 2 (Feb. 23, 2006); Prosecutor v. Milosevic,
Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel: Corrigendum, para. 32 (Sept. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/motion/040929.htm.
177. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Transcript of Record at
46690:10–16 (Judge Robinson: “Mr. Milosevic, that, again, is a matter in relation to
which you owe a great debt of gratitude to assigned counsel. Through their action,
through their professionalism, we are considering now a motion to subpoena certain witnesses, and without their intervention, without their help, we would not have been considering this.” The Accused: “Yes, I know about that. I know about that, Mr. Robinson.”).
178. E.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel Request for Provisional Release, para. 2 (Feb. 23, 2006) (indicating that the Accused
first requested provisional release orally, which was then followed by Assigned Counsel’s formal written Request for Provisional Release Pursuant to Rule 65).
179. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Prosecution Response to
“Assigned Counsel Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel” and to “Defence Reply to ‘Prosecution Motion to Strike Ground of Appeal (3) from Assigned Counsel “Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel,”’” para. 90 n.144 (Oct. 11, 2004).
180. E.g., Trial Tr. at 34851:9–10 (Jan. 11, 2005), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No.
IT-02-54-T, available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/050111IT.htm.
181. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19.
182. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on Defence Counsel Motion to Withdraw, para. 5 (Nov. 2, 2000) (quoting Letter from Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza to the Trial Chamber (Oct. 24, 2000)), available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/
cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/021100.htm.
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stated that the Tribunal was committing “a mockery of justice” 183 and
instructed his counsel not to represent him in any way. 184 Likewise, Milosevic contested the legitimacy of the ICTY, accusing the Tribunal of
being “not [a] juridical institution” but rather “a political tool.” 185 However, parallels between the two cases end there; the voluntarily disruptive
conduct of Barayagwiza breached a threshold which Milosevic did not
aspire to reach. Barayagwiza refused to attend proceedings, thereby apparently “boycotting” the tribunal. 186 As a result of Barayagwiza’s instructing his lawyers not to represent him, his lawyers remained passive
and did not mount an active defense. 187 Additionally, Barayagwiza did
not assert his right to self-representation. 188
By contrast, to quote the prosecution, “despite his rejection of the tribunal and its authority as such . . . the accused Milosevic has, to a large
extent, taken part in the proceedings in an orderly fashion.” 189 The Milosevic Trial Chamber explicitly distinguished the conduct of the former
President from that of Barayagwiza, noting that “[n]o such circumstances
have, as yet, arisen in this trial.” 190 Thus, although certain aspects of the
behavior of Milosevic may parallel the conduct of the ICTR-accused, the
primary source of the obstructionism in the Barayagwiza case, i.e., the
refusal of the accused to attend court, was absent in the case of the former President.
The conduct of ICTY-accused Seselj provides a further example of the
high threshold an accused must breach in order to constitute obstructionism. Vojislav Seselj, representing himself, has consistently derogated
from the issues at hand 191 and refused to follow the procedural rules of
183. Id. para. 12.
184. Id. para. 11 (citing Letter from Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza to the Trial Chamber
(Oct. 23, 2000)).
185. See Trial Tr. at 25:1–2 (Aug. 30, 2001), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-0254-T, available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/010830SC.htm.
186. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on Defence Counsel Motion to Withdraw, para. 16 (Nov. 2, 2000).
187. Id. para. 17.
188. Id., Concurring and Separate Opinion of Judge Gunawardana, para. 3.
189. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 11 (Feb. 28, 2003) (on
file with the author).
190. Id. para. 40.
191. E.g., Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 7
(May 9, 2003) (“The Accused devoted only thirteen pages of his ninety-three page ‘Reply
to the Prosecutor’s Motion to impose defence counsel on me against my will’ . . . to the
concrete legal question actually at issue.”). The Tribunal classified the remainder as
“frivolous abuse of the Tribunal’s Translation Unit.” Id. para. 7 n.7.
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the ICTY. 192 Seselj consistently filed handwritten, “excessively long,”
and “largely irrelevant” motions. 193 He publicly expressed his intent to
cause harm to, or indeed to “attack” 194 and “destroy” the Tribunal, 195 and
to use the proceedings to promote Serb national interests rather than as a
means to defend himself against the charges alleged against him. 196 Furthermore, he refused to use a laptop or typewriter as “he was ‘afraid of
receiving an electric shock,’” 197 and repeatedly insisted that he only understands the Serbian language despite the fact that Croatian is simply a
variant of that language and evidence showed that he understands Eng-

192. Id. para. 23 (noting that, inter alia, the Accused “submitted a hand written petition
directly to the Appeals Chamber” knowing that this violated the Rules, that a selfdescribed “legal adviser” to the accused submitted a letter to the Registrar
“[un]accompanied by the necessary power of attorney” and who apparently did not meet
the requirement that counsel speak one of the working languages of the Tribunal, and that
the accused, in a petition, made “frivolous demands framed in language inappropriate for
a legal document”).
193. Id.
194. In a 1994 interview for the French film “Crimes et Criminels,” when he was
asked what would be his defense in the event of a case being taken against him at the
ICTY, the Accused responded: “I am not planning to defend myself, I can only attack.”
Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing
Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence (Feb. 28, 2003) (on file with the author). He also said: “Personally, I do not recognise this Hague Tribunal. I think it has no
legal foundation, but if I am ever invited to The Hague I’ll gladly go there immediately. I
would never miss such a show.” Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on
Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his
Defence, para. 4 n. 5 (May 9, 2003). Furthermore, at a public rally on the evening before
he left Belgrade for The Hague, the accused Seselj said “that he would put ‘the Americans, the Hague tribunal and NATO’ on trial.” Sofia Hilden, Serb Hardliner Seselj Arrives in Hague, REUTERS, Feb. 24, 2003. The Accused also made the following comments: “With their stupid charges against me they have come up against the greatest living legal Serb mind . . . . I shall blast them to pieces.” Seselj Dismisses Hague Indictment,
ONASA NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 17, 2003.
195. On February 3, 2003, the news agency Deutsche Presse Agentur reported that the
Accused was “reported to have said that ‘he would gladly travel to The Hague to ‘destroy’ the . . . tribunal in case it open[ed] a trial against him.’” Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case
No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to
Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 4 n. 5 (May 9, 2003) (quoting DEUTSCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, Feb. 3, 2003).
196. See Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Prosecution’s Motion for Order
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 1 (Feb. 28, 2003)
(on file with the author).
197. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Trial Tr. at 66, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/transe67/030325SC.htm; Seselj, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 23
(May 9, 2003).
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lish. 198 The trial chamber found the foregoing “attitude and actions . . .
indicative of obstructionism on [Seselj’s] part.” 199 As recognized by the
Prosecution, the similarities between Seselj and Milosevic are remote. 200
Although Milosevic used the Serbian form of address rather than that
customarily used at the Tribunal, Milosevic remained moderately respectful to Tribunal judges. 201 In the highly publicized case of United
States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, the right to proceed pro se was revoked
where the accused filed frivolous motions which repeatedly insulted the
judge, among others. 202 This misconduct indicates a lower threshold than

198. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion
for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, paras. 24–25
(May 9, 2003).
199. Id. para. 26.
200. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 11 (Feb. 28, 2003) (on
file with the author). The Prosecution stated that:
As a former head of state, the accused Milosevic does not need to be disruptive,
obstructionist or scandalous in order to remain in the public’s eye. Therefore,
despite his rejection of the Tribunal and its authority as such, to date the accused Milosevic has, to a large extent, taken part in the proceedings in an orderly fashion. The opposite is to be expected from the accused Seselj. The accused Seselj thrives on the creation of the scandal, conspiracies and publicity.
Id.; Seselj, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist
Vojislav Seselj with his Defence, para. 4 (May 9, 2003). The ICTY stated that:
The Prosecution argues that the circumstances of the Accused’s request to represent himself are distinguishable from those of Slobodan Milosevic who is
currently the only other accused before this Tribunal conducting his own defence. The Prosecution also requested the imposition of defence counsel in the
Milosevic case, but in that case the main reason was concern about the toll that
self-representation was taking on Milosevic’s health. In contrast to Milosevic,
the Prosecution believes the Accused Seselj has intimated to and may behave in
a ‘disruptive, obstructionist or scandalous’ manner.
Id.
201. Molly Moore, Trial of Milosevic Holds Lessons for Iraqi Prosecutors, WASH.
POST, Oct. 18, 2005, at A19. Theodor Meron, the president of the ICTY, remarked,
“‘[Milosevic] complies with the rules of the game for the most part. If he insists on calling the judges ‘Mister’ instead of ‘Your Honor,’ I regret that. But it doesn’t mean he’s
not otherwise respectful to the judges.’” Id.
202. United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2003) (order appointing counsel of record), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr00455/docs/69412/0.pdf; Jerry Seper, Moussaoui Right to Represent Self Revoked,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2003, at A02, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/
functions/print.php?StoryID=20031114-113846-2466r.
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the Barayagwiza or Seselj standards, but remains inapplicable to Milosevic.
There appears to be a lack of consensus with regard to the minimum
threshold to be met to constitute obstructionism in domestic jurisdictions.
In the U.S. case of United States v. Davis, 203 counsel was assigned as the
accused delved into obscure and irrelevant discussion whenever he was
afforded the opportunity to speak. 204 The trial in Duke v. United States 205
was infused with accusations that the prosecution was the result of a conspiracy to frame the accused. 206 The court indicated that the accused
could not be allowed to turn the proceeding into a “Roman holiday” or
use his pro se status “as a launching ground for missiles, even if . . . he
believed his best defense was . . . trying the prosecutors and witnesses for
the prosecution.” 207 Although this displays certain comparisons to the
Milosevic case, it is arguable that the level of deliberate misconduct in
these cases exceeds that of the former President.
Dissentient Justice Blackmun in Faretta v. California suggested that
the presentation of a politically inspired defense may defeat the right to
self-representation, proposing that the right does not accommodate “the
whimsical—albeit voluntary—caprice of every accused who wishes to
use his trial as a vehicle for personal or political self-gratification.”208
Similarly, in United States v. Frazier-El, the defendant’s insistence on
representing himself so that he could present “frivolous” arguments in
his defense was sufficient to deny him his right to proceed pro se. 209
This premise stretches the theory of obstructionism to the extent that it
excessively restricts the accused’s defense rights. According to Judge
Antonetti’s dissenting opinion in Seselj, Faretta established that a judge
may discontinue an accused’s self-representation if he or she “deliberately adopts behavior that is serious and obstructionist.” 210 According to
203. 260 F. Supp. 1009, 1021 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
204. Id. at 1021. The obstructionism in Davis was due to the defendant’s mental incapacities. The court found that Davis lacked sufficient mental capacity to represent himself. Id.
205. 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1958).
206. Id. at 726–27. The accused alleged that a federal judge and members of the U.S.
Attorney’s staff were among those involved in framing him. Id. at 727.
207. Id.
208. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 849 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
209. United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2000).
210. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on the Accused’s Motion to
Re-examine the Decision to Assign Standby Counsel, Opinion Dissidente du Juge Antonetti, para. 8 (Mar. 1, 2005) (“[S]i l’accusé adopte délibérément un comportement grave et
obstructioniste.” [“[I]f the Accused deliberately adopts behavior that is serious and obstructionist.”] (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46) (author’s translation)).
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Judge Antonetti, the accused must seriously interfere with proceedings, 211 repeatedly breach the orders and decisions of the Trial Chamber,
interrupt proceedings through bad behavior, or use profanities. 212 Milosevic did not come close to breaching this threshold of deliberate obstructionism.
3.2: Unintentional Disruption
While it is clear that while a deliberately disruptive defendant reaching
a certain level of misconduct may be denied the pro se right, “a more
complex problem arises when the pro se defendant unintentionally disrupts the proceedings but not to an extent that would justify his permanent removal from the courtroom.” 213 At the outset, it is important to
note that although a pro se defendant will inevitably take longer to present his defense than experienced counsel will, 214 “a simple lack of legal
knowledge may not be the . . . sole reason for denying a pro se request.” 215 This principle is self-evident, because if a court required a de-

211. Id. para. 8 (“[L]e droit de l’accusé à se défendre lui-même peut être restreint au
motif que l’accusé perturbe gravement le procès.” [“[T]he right of the accused to defend
himself may be limited on grounds that the accused seriously disrupts the proceeding.”]
(emphasis added) (translation by Brooklyn Journal of International Law)).
212. Id. para. 10. Judge Antonetti stated that
La notion d’obstruction à la justice et au bon déroulement du procès doit en effet s’entendre de la violation répétée des ordres et décisions de la Chambre, de
la perturbation du déroulement du procès par des écarts de conduite, de
l’utilisation d’un langage outrageant ou de toute autre faute témoignant d’un
comportement délibérément grave et obstructionniste. La Chambre ne peut pas
à ce stade limiter le droit de l’Accusé à assurer personnellement sa défense en
se fondant sur des « intentions » obstructionnistes.”
[The notion of the obstruction of justice and the proper conduct of proceedings
must involve repeated violations of order and decisions of the Chamber, disturbances of the proceedings through bad conduct, the use of insulting language or
other conduct exhibiting deliberate, serious and obstructionist behaviour. The
Chamber cannot, at this stage, restrict the right of the accused to present his
own defence on the basis of obstructionist “intentions.”]
Id. (author’s translation).
213. Homiak, supra note 5, at 920.
214. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“Given
the general likelihood that pro se defendants have only rudimentary acquaintanceship
with the rules of evidence and courtroom protocol, a measure of unorthodoxy, confusion
and delay is likely, perhaps inevitable, in pro se cases.” (footnote omitted)).
215. Homiak, supra note 5, at 910; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835
(1975) (“[A] defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in
order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation . . . .”).
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fendant to possess legal knowledge as a pre-requisite to granting the right
to represent himself, the right to self-representation “would become essentially meaningless.” 216 In other words, an accused may elect to represent himself even if his lack of experience causes significant inefficiency
in the proceedings. 217
What is contentious in the context of the Milosevic case is the decision
of the Trial Chamber to base its decision to assign counsel on the consequences of the recurring ill health of the Accused. It is the contention of
this paper that this innovative expansion of the circumstances in which
the pro se right may be restricted, without the circumscription necessary
to confine the decision to the specific circumstances of the Milosevic
case, leaves open the possibility that the right to self-representation and
other minimum guarantees which are composite elements of the right to
a fair trial will in the future be abrogated.
3.2.1: Trial Chamber Decision
As seen in Section 1.3.1, the recurrent ill health of Milosevic inhibited
the expeditious completion of the case. 218 The Trial Chamber indicated
that medical reports filed in July and August 2004 made it “plain . . . that
the Accused is not fit enough to defend himself and that should he continue to represent himself, there will be further delays in the progress of
the trial.” 219 Doctors advised that Milosevic could suffer “a hypertensive
emergency, a potentially life-threatening condition.” 220 On this basis, the
Tribunal felt obliged to assign counsel in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. 221
The Trial Chamber conceded that no precedent existed for this reasoning. 222 Nevertheless, it promulgated the theory that “[d]isruption of a
trial, whatever the circumstances, may give rise to the risk of a miscarriage of justice because the whole proceedings have not been conducted
216. Homiak, supra note 5, at 910.
217. Note, Hybrid Defense, supra note 26, at 346.
218. Trial Tr. at 32357:9–10 (Sept. 2, 2004), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-0254-T, available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/040902IT.htm (“The health of the
accused has been a major problem in the progress of the trial.”).
219. Id. at 32358:4–6.
220. Id. at 32357:24–25.
221. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 65 (Sept. 22, 2004) (citing the concern that the trial could
“last for an unreasonably long time” and noting the Tribunal’s “duty to ensure a fair and
expeditious trial and its responsibility to preserve the integrity of its proceedings”).
222. Id. para. 37 (“[E]xtensive research has not led to the identification of any case in
any jurisdiction where counsel has been assigned to an accused person because he was
unfit to conduct his case as the result of impaired physical health . . . .”).
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and concluded fairly.” 223 This decision was based on an examination of
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and U.N. Human Rights Committee
(HRC) as well the jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL. 224 In
contrast to its 2003 ruling, the Trial Chamber sought to demonstrate that
the various adjudicative bodies recognized a potentially broad range of
possible exceptions to the right to self-representation. 225
Furthermore, in its 2004 ruling, the Trial Chamber relied heavily on the
ECtHR decision in Croissant, 226 despite having found in 2003 that case
to be “distinguishable from the instant case” to the extent that it involved
objection to appointment of additional counsel. 227 It also distinguished
from the case at hand the views of the HRC in Brian & Michael Hill v.
Spain, 228 despite having found this decision to be “highly relevant to the
correct interpretation of Article 21(4) (d)” in its 2003 ruling.229 However,
in its 2003 ruling, ignoring jurisprudence to the contrary, 230 the Trial
Chamber appeared to interpret the HRC’s views as prohibiting exceptions to the pro se right. 231

223. Id. para. 33.
224. Id. paras. 38–44.
225. Id.
226. Id. para. 43.
227. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the
Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, para. 32 (Apr. 4, 2003).
228. Hill v. Spain, Commc’n No. 526/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/526/1993, para.
14.2 (June 23, 1997). This case concerned a Spanish law which specified that although an
accused had the right to defend himself, “‘such defence should take place by competent
counsel, paid by the State when necessary.’” Id. The HRC found, without further discussion, that the right to defend oneself under Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR had not been
respected. Id.
229. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the
Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, para. 37 (Apr. 4, 2003). The
Tribunal further looked to the U.N. Secretary-General’s report on the Statute of the
ICTY, which indicated that the “internationally recognized standards” relevant to the
rights of the accused “are, in particular, contained in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Id. (quoting The Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993),
para. 106, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993)).
230. Gonzalez
v.
Spain,
Commc’n
No.
1005/2001,
U.N.
Doc.
CCPR/C/74/D/1005/2001, para. 4.3 (Mar. 22, 2002); Marín Gómez v. Spain, Commc’n
No. 865/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/895/1999, para. 8.4 (Nov. 5, 2001); Torregrosa
Lafuente v. Spain, Commc’n No. 866/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/866/1999, para. 6.3
(Aug. 31, 2001) (finding that domestic legislation implementing mandatory representation by counsel did not violate Article 14(1) of the ICCPR).
231. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the
Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, para. 36 (Apr. 4, 2003) (“[T]he
only case on the issue decided under these conventions which the Trial Chamber has been

590

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 32:2

Side-stepping the inaccuracy of its earlier assertions, the Trial Chamber in its 2004 ruling disregarded the HRC’s views on the basis that the
Committee had given no reason for its determination and that it was not
faced with circumstances which could be compared to the Milosevic
case. 232 Further, although it had distinguished Barayagwiza (ICTR) in its
2003 ruling, the Trial Chamber regarded this case 233 as well as Norman
(SCSL) 234 and the interim case of Seselj (ICTY) 235 to be authority for the
fact that “such factors as the ability of the accused to conduct his own
defence, as well as his attitude and actions” should be taken into account
when determining what course might be appropriate in the circumstances. 236 This assertion markedly broadens the principles elucidated in
these judgments.
3.2.2: Appeals Chamber Decision
Despite these inconsistencies in the Trial Chamber’s reasoning, the
Appeals Chamber upheld its exercise of discretion in assigning counsel,
reaffirming that “it cannot be that the only kind of disruption legitimately
cognizable by a Trial Chamber is the intentional variety.” 237 The reasoning upon which the Appeals Chamber based this premise was no more
consistent than that of the Trial Chamber. In the form of a rather puzzling
rhetorical question, the Appeals Chamber, in its decision, asked:
How should the Tribunal treat a defendant whose health, while good
enough to engage in the ordinary and non-strenuous activities of everyday life, is not sufficiently robust to withstand all the rigors of trial

able to find, did not allow for such an exception: the above mentioned Michael and Brian
Hill v. Spain.”).
232. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 44 (Sept. 22, 2004).
233. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on Defence Counsel Motion to Withdraw, para. 2; Concurring and Separate Opinion of Judge Gunawardana (Nov. 2, 2000).
234. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on the Application of
Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation Under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of
the Special Court, paras. 8, 27 (June 8, 2004).
235. Prosecutor v. Seselj, IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with His Defence, paras. 20, 27, 30; Disposition at 13 (May 9, 2003).
236. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 38 (Sept. 22, 2004); Id. paras. 39–41 (discussing the
aforementioned cases).
237. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 14
(Nov. 1, 2004).
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work—the late nights, the stressful cross-examinations, the courtroom
confrontations—unless the hearing schedule is reduced to one day a
week, or even one day a month? 238

Without giving a substantive answer to this monologue, the Appeals
Chamber went on to question whether the Tribunal ought to “be forced to
choose between setting [such a] . . . defendant free and allowing the case
to grind to an effective halt?” 239 Giving the impression that the solution
was self-evident, the Appeals Chamber responded ambiguously that “to
ask that question is to answer it.” 240 No further scrutiny was accorded to
the question of non-intentional disruption.
The manner in which the concept of non-intentional disruption was
promulgated is wholly unsatisfactory. Neither the Appeals Chamber nor
the Trial Chamber attempted to provide any guidance as to the degree of
ill health necessary in order for the tribunal to acquire the discretion to
limit the right to self-representation. The Tribunal thereby failed to specify to what extent and for how long the ill health of the accused must delay proceedings in order for the tribunal to be able to exercise this discretion. The necessary cause, nature, and potential duration of such ill health
remain undetermined.
It also remains unclear how “healthy” participants must be in order to
qualify for pro se status before the Tribunal, or how “unhealthy” they
must become in order for this minimum guarantee to be denied. Under
the precedent established by the Appeals Chamber, it is to be expected
that counsel might be assigned to every defendant, like Milosevic, with
high blood pressure or potential heart problems. How much further this
precedent stretches, however, remains a question of speculation. It is not
implausible to surmise that any defendant with any potential health problems, no matter how trivial, could be denied the right to represent themselves in person. This possibility creates obvious anomalies, particularly
given that the defense rights of the accused set out in Article 21(4) are
guaranteed “in fully equality.” 241
Arguably, the Tribunal deliberately phrased its reasoning in ambiguous
terms to avoid drawing attention to the novelty of its contention, the inconsistency in the reasoning of the chambers, and the lack of precedent
to support it. As it stands, given the lack of definitive guidelines provided
by the Appeals Chamber, case-by-case analysis will be required to determine which circumstances will merit curtailing the right to self-

238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 21(4).
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representation where non-intentional delay occurs. This leaves the future
of self-representation, as well as the other minimum guarantees in Article
21(4) of the Statute, in unclear territory. Such lack of clarity critically
undermines the significance of the right to self-representation and compromises the possibility of achieving a fair trial.
In order to estimate the potential parameters of non-intentional disruption, it may be useful to examine the cases cited by the Appeals Chamber. 242 The U.S. case of Johnson v. State 243 provides authority for the
withdrawal of the right to self-representation where, as in Johnson, expert testimony indicates that defendant’s fragile mental state “might well
succumb to the added stress of self-representation and deteriorate to the
point where it would become necessary to continuously disrupt the proceedings to monitor his ‘present’ mental abilities and competence.” 244
This suggests that the potential ill health to which the concept of nonintentional disruption applies appears to encompass both physical and
mental health. The Johnson concept cannot, however, be equated to Milosevic, as the capacity of the accused to stand trial was one of the matters
at issue in Johnson. 245 This position implied a level of trial disruption
that far exceeds the Milosevic situation. 246 It may, perhaps, be surmised
that where mental health is at issue, a rather insidious level of disruption
is necessary.
The Milosevic Appeals Chamber also cited the U.S. case of Savage v.
Estelle, 247 where the trial court did not allow the pro se defendant to con242. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 14
n.43 (Nov. 1, 2004).
243. Johnson v. State, 17 P.3d 1008, 2001 Nev. LEXIS 8 (Nev. 2001).
244. Id., 2001 Nev. LEXIS at **28.
245. Id. (generally).
246. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Prosecution Response to
“Assigned Counsel Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel” and to “Defence Reply to “Prosecution Motion to Strike Ground of Appeal (3) from Assigned Counsel “Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel,”’” para. 54 (Oct. 11, 2004) (citing Prosecutor v. Strugar,
Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re the Defence Motion to Terminate Proceedings (May
26, 2004) (“[T]here is no question that the Accused is unfit to stand trial: he clearly meets
all the tests for fitness listed in the test recently formulated in the Strugar case.”); see also
Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 14 n.42
(Nov. 1, 2004) (“We reject Assigned Counsel’s contention that Milosevic’s inability to
represent himself necessarily rendered him unfit to stand trial at all. Trial litigation is an
extraordinarily demanding profession. It cannot be that only those defendants capable of
meeting its demands are formally fit to stand trial.”).
247. 924 F.2d 1459 (9th Cir. 1990).
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duct voir dire, cross-examine witnesses, make objections, or argue before
the jury without leave of court because of his incapacitating stutter. 248
This case immeasurably broadens the range of situations to which the
Milosevic precedent may apply. A stutter is simply a speech impediment
which relates in no way to the health of the accused, or his capacity to
attend proceedings or stand trial. It certainly cannot be classified as “behavior.” Accordingly, given that the parameters of the exception recognized in Milosevic remain undefined, the potential breadth of conditions
to which the decision could apply is unsettling.
Curiously, neither the Appeals Chamber nor the Trial Chamber referred to the proposition in Strugar that “[i]n some cases legal assistance
to an accused may be a sufficient measure to compensate for any limitations of capacity of the accused to stand trial.” 249 While this proposition
initially appears to substantiate Milosevic, Strugar in fact concerned a
situation in which the defense claimed that the accused was unable to
stand trial, 250 a stage to which it was not foreseen that the Milosevic proceedings would degenerate. 251 Hence, the Strugar proposition, rather
than substantiating the Milosevic decision, highlights that the assignment
of counsel is appropriate only where an extremely prohibitive level of
disruption has occurred, i.e., to the extent that proceedings are in danger
of completely shutting down.
Furthermore, in Strugar, the provision of legal assistance appears to
have been considered suitable where the individual’s incapacity to stand
trial was “of such a nature and effect that measures can be taken to sufficiently alleviate the impairment, or its effect, so that the trial can con-

248. Id. at 1461.
249. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re The Defence Motion to
Terminate Proceedings, para. 39 (May 26, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/
strugar/trialc1/decision-e/040526.pdf. The Prosecution proposed that this decision “at a
minimum leaves open the possibility, and at a maximum supports the contention, that illhealth can justify the assignment of legal assistance in order to enable a trial to continue.”
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Prosecution Reply to “Amici Curiae
Submissions in Response to the Trial Chamber’s “Further Order on Future Conduct of
the Trial Concerning Assignment of Defence Counsel” Dated 6 August 2004,” para. 18
(Aug. 19, 2004) (on file with the ICTY).
250. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re the Defence Motion to
Terminate Proceedings, para. 5 (May 26, 2004).
251. See Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of
the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, at para. 14 n. 42
(Nov. 1, 2004). (“We reject Assigned Counsel’s contention that Milosevic’s inability to
represent himself necessarily rendered him unfit to stand trial at all. Trial litigation is an
extraordinarily demanding profession. It cannot be that only those defendants capable of
meeting its demands are formally fit to stand trial.”).
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tinue.” 252 The Tribunal suggested that if a defendant’s unfitness is temporary, then an appropriate remedy may be to adjourn until “the accused
has sufficiently recovered.” 253 It further stated, however, that “[o]ther
cases may require that a trial be abandoned,” 254 meaning presumably that
permanent unfitness may lead to termination of the proceedings.
Thus, the measures suggested in Strugar were structured in a hierarchy
whereby the measure adopted must be suitable to meet the needs of the
circumstances of the case, or, in other words, proportionate to the interest
pursued. Section Four will examine the disproportionality of the Appeals
Chamber decision in Milosevic and its effect on the dignity and autonomy of the Accused.
SECTION FOUR: PROPORTIONALITY
4.1: Mode of Representation Assigned: Proportionate to Aim Pursued?
As seen in Section 1.3.2, instead of merely appointing counsel to assist
Milosevic with the presentation of his defense, counsel was initially assigned to fully represent him. This decision purported to allow the Accused to continue to “actively participate along with counsel in the
preparation and presentation of his case.” 255 His participation was, however, “secondary to that of Assigned Counsel and strictly contingent on
the discretionary permission of the Trial Chamber in any given instance.” 256 Thus, the burden of the defense was placed on the Assigned
Counsel. This situation may have been based on the supposition expressed in Parren v. State that “[t]here can be but one captain of the
ship.” 257
Subsequent to the assignment of counsel, Milosevic categorically refused to question witnesses 258 or cooperate with Assigned Counsel. This
252. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re the Defence Motion to
Terminate Proceedings, para. 39 (May 26, 2004).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 68 (Sept. 22, 2004) (noting that the decision “does not
deprive him of his right to speak either by giving evidence, examining and re-examining
witnesses as permitted by the Chamber, selecting and submitting documentary evidence,
and making final submissions on the evidence”).
256. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 7
(Nov. 1, 2004).
257. Parren v. State, 523 A.2d 597, 599 (Md. 1987).
258. See Trial Tr. at 32348:2–3 (Sept. 1, 2004), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT02-54-T, (Milosevic: “I do not accept any decrease of that right or any renouncing of that
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mutinous situation appears to substantiate the theory propounded by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Faretta v. California that as “unwanted counsel
‘represents’ the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal
fiction,” in this situation “counsel is not an assistant, but a master.” 259
Ironically, this theory was concurrently recognized by the Trial Chamber
as “the classic statement of the right to self-representation.” 260
4.1.1: Proportionality
While the Milosevic Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s decision to assign counsel, it acknowledged that the Trial Chamber had, by
relegating Milosevic to a “visibly second-tier role in the trial,” sharply
restricted the Accused’s “ability to participate in the conduct of his case
in any way.” 261 The Appeals Chamber reprimanded the Trial Chamber
for not recognizing that restrictions on the pro se right “must be limited
to the minimum extent necessary to protect the Tribunal’s interest in assuring a reasonably expeditious trial.” 262 This failure, it felt, was “a fundamental error of law.” 263
Various jurisdictions utilize a “basic proportionality principle” in considering limitations on fundamental rights, which is that “any restriction
of a fundamental right must be in service of ‘a sufficiently important objective,’ and must ‘impair the right . . . no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.’” 264 The ICTY has noted that “[a] measure in
public international law is proportional only when it is (1) suitable, (2)
necessary and when (3) its degree and scope remain in a reasonable rela-

right altogether.”); Id. at 32441:8–12 (Sept. 7, 2004) (Milosevic: “I actually have no intention of exercising any rights as Mr. Kay’s assistant. I’m not going to accept that, exercising my right to defence in that way, that is to say depending on your mercy, that you
are just giving me crumbs of that right and in that way I am going to exercise my right to
defence. So I ask you that you return my right of defence to me . . . .”).
259. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820–21 (1975).
260. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Counsel, para. 45 (Sept. 22, 2004).
261. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 16
(Nov. 1, 2004).
262. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 17
(Nov. 1, 2004).
263. Id.
264. Id. (quoting de Freitas v. Permanent Sec’y of Ministry of Agric., Fisheries, Lands
and Housing, [1998] 1 A.C. 69 (P.C.) (U.K.) (citing Zimbabwean, South African, and
Canadian cases)).
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tionship to the envisaged target.” 265 The U.N. HRC has similarly observed that restrictions on the right to freedom of movement, for example, “must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might
achieve the desired result; and they must be proportionate to the interest
to be protected.” 266 The ECtHR has also held that “there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and
the aim pursued.” 267
According to this principle, Assigned Counsel may “do as little as
needed to ensure judicial economy and an orderly courtroom” should the
defendant object to counsel’s assistance. 268 This was acknowledged by
Judge Antonetti in a dissenting opinion in Seselj, 269 which was handed
down between the decisions of the Trial Chamber and the Appeals
Chamber in Milosevic. In Seselj, it was felt that standby counsel should
only take over the defense from the Accused at trial “in exceptional circumstances . . . should the Trial Chamber find, following a warning, that
the Accused is engaging in disruptive conduct or conduct requiring his
removal from the courtroom under Rule 80(B).” 270
The Appeals Chamber found the significant curtailment of Milosevic’s
role in his own defense to be disproportionate in light of the Accused’s
265. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-AR65, Decision on Fatmir Limaj’s Request for Provisional Release, para. 13 (Oct. 31, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/limaj/appeal/decision-e/031031-3.htm.
266. U.N. Int’l Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 176, para. 14,
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (May 12, 2003). The HRC also stated that “[t]he application of restrictions in any individual case must . . . meet the test of necessity and the requirements of proportionality.” Id. para. 16.
267. Chassagnou v. France, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, 53. The Chassagnou court also
held that only “indisputable imperatives” can justify restrictions on a right protected by
the ECHR, and even then only if the restrictions are a “necessary” and “proportionate”
means of advancing the state objective. Id. paras. 112–13; see also Croissant v. F.R.G.,
237 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 20, 43 (1992) (Messrs. Frowein, Weitzel, Schermers & Mrs.
Liddy, dissenting) (noting that while the appointment of a third defence counsel was appropriate in the light of “the public interest to ensure the proper running of the trial,” his
active intervention in the trial was “neither necessary nor required”).
268. Joshua L. Howard, Hybrid Representation and Standby Counsel: Let’s Clear the
Air for the Attorneys of South Carolina, 52 S.C. L. REV. 851, 873 (2001).
269. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on the Accused’s Motion to
Re-Examine the Decision to Assign Standby Counsel, Opinion Dissidente du Judge Antonetti, para. 9 (Mar. 1, 2005) (noting “[I]l convient de garder en mémoire que la mesure
d’ingérence doit être nécessaire et proportionnée au but légitime”) [“[I]t is advisable to
remember that the measurement of interference must be necessary and proportionate to
the legitimate goal”] (translation by Brooklyn Journal of International Law)).
270. Prosecutor v. Seselj, IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with His Defence, para. 30 (May 9, 2003).
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vigorous two-day opening statement without interruption or apparent
difficulty and a lack of evidence that Milosevic’s condition was permanent or that he had suffered from any health problems since late July. 271
On these bases, the Appeals Chamber ordered that the practical impact of
the assignment of counsel should be minimized “except to the extent required by the interests of justice.” 272 The regime put in place thereafter
was to be rooted, therefore, “in the default presumption that, when he
[wa]s physically capable of doing so, Milosevic [would] take the lead in
presenting his case.” 273 The captaincy of the ship had reverted to the Accused.
Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber was entrusted with the discretion to
“steer a careful course” between allowing the Accused to take the lead
and safeguarding “the Tribunal’s basic interest in a reasonably expeditious resolution of the cases before it.” 274 Crucially, the trial could continue in the event Milosevic was temporarily incapable of participating. 275 If Milosevic elected not to continue to act as counsel, became belligerent or uncooperative, or proved incapable of conducting even part of
the defense, the Trial Chamber could direct Assigned Counsel to proceed
with the representation. 276
Indeed, this very situation occurred when, during the presentation of
the evidence of defense witness Kosta Bulatovic in April 2005, the Accused was unable to attend court through illness. 277 The Trial Chamber
decided nevertheless to hear the remainder of the evidence, noting, “[i]f
the decision of the Appeals Chamber is authoritative for anything, it
seems to us that it authorises the completion of a witness’s testimony in
the temporary absence of the accused.” 278 Thus, while Milosevic stood at
271. Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, para. 18
(Nov. 1, 2004) (footnote omitted).
272. Id. para. 19.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. para. 20.
276. See Commonwealth v. Africa, 353 A.2d 855, 864 (Pa. 1976).
277. The witness initially gave evidence on April 14, 2005. Trial Tr. at 38503, Prosecutor
v.
Milosevic,
Case
No.
IT-02-54-T,
available
at
http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/050414IT.htm. He was examined in chief and partially
cross-examined before the case was adjourned over the weekend. When the trial resumed
on April 19, the Accused was absent through illness. Id. at 38577:5–6, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/050419IT.htm.
278. Trial Tr. at 38591:1–3 (Apr. 19, 2005), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-0254-T; see also Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.4, Contempt Proceedings Against
Kosta Bulatovic, Decision on Contempt of the Tribunal (May 13, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/judgement/bulatovic.htm; Milosevic, Case No.
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the helm, the compass remained in the hands of the Trial Chamber. Significantly, the Trial Chamber was careful in this instance to ensure that a
video recording and transcript of the proceedings should be delivered to
the Accused to enable him to review the remainder of the evidence, and
declared that, should it be necessary, Bulatovic could be recalled. 279 This
ensured that the Accused remained in control of the presentation of the
evidence and of his defense strategy. The Trial Chamber thereafter consistently concerned itself with these interests of the Accused, adjourning
the proceedings when Milosevic could not attend due to ill health. 280
Thus, the dignity and autonomy of the Accused were essentially preserved.
4.1.2: Dignity and Autonomy
Dignity and autonomy were first recognized in Faretta to be essential
factors of the pro se right: “The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences
of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage.” 281 Supplying a defense to the accused does not sufficiently protect
the individual’s autonomy; rather, the defense must be the individual’s
own. In order to preserve the Faretta right to proceed pro se, it is crucial
that the accused retains final authority over significant decisions. 282 In
McKaskle v. Wiggins, the U.S. Supreme Court held that counsel must not
unduly interfere with the perception that the accused is acting as lead
counsel. 283 Thus, counsel “must generally respect” the defendant’s preference to proceed “solo,” 284 and a defendant may not be “forced to sub-

IT-02-54-A-R77.4, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Kosta Bulatovic Contempt Proceedings (Aug. 29, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/
judgement/bul-cj050829e.htm.
279. Trial Tr. at 38591:5–8 (Apr. 19, 2005), Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-0254-T.
280. See, e.g., id. at 46635 (Nov. 16, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/
icty/transe54/051116IT.htm. Milosevic indicated, “I cannot call the next witness. I don’t
feel well, and I can’t go on sitting here, and I want to say that I am opposed to any hearing in my absence.” Id. at lines 9–11. The evidence of Lieutenant Colonel Zlatko Odak
had just been completed. Id. The trial was adjourned until the Accused was once again fit
to attend trial. Arguably this caution was strengthened by the contempt proceedings that
resulted from Kosta Bulatovic’s refusal to give evidence in the absence of the Accused.
281. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
282. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 188; see also Parren v. State, 523 A.2d 597, 599 (Md. 1987).
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mit to counsel’s unwanted control.” 285 This “may mitigate his distrust
both of the criminal justice system and of his counsel” while safeguarding his dignity and enlarging his freedom of choice. 286
It must not be forgotten, of course, that the assistance of counsel is
considered vital to due process, 287 and particularly so in adversarial systems. 288 The recognition of these two interests of the accused—“full representation” and self-representation—as autonomous entities leads to a
conflict “between preservation of the reliability of the judicial process
and protection of the dignity of the defendant,” 289 as it appears that “each
right can only be exercised at the expense of the other.” 290
The possibility of assigning advisory, 291 standby, 292 or hybrid counsel 293 mitigates this apparent mutual exclusivity and ensures that both the
285. Welcom, supra note 29, at 582.
286. Id. at 585.
287. Colquitt, supra note 36, at 98–99.
288. See Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Ethical Obligations of Counsel in Criminal Proceedings: Representing an Unwilling Client, 12 CRIM. L.F. 487, 488 (2001) (“Vital as
representation is to the litigant’s assertion for his rights before the courts and other adjudicative bodies, it is particularly indispensable in an adversarial as opposed to an inquisitorial system of justice.”).
289. Welcom, supra note 29, at 581.
290. Mark D. Ridley, Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se: Faretta v. California and Beyond, 40 ALB. L. REV. 423, 432 (1976) (footnote omitted).
291. Some courts use the terms “advisory counsel,” “standby counsel,” and “hybrid
representation” interchangeably. United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1097 n.2 (4th
Cir. 1997). But see, e.g., Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403, 407 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussing use of and distinctions between the terms “standby counsel,” “advisory counsel,”
and “co-counsel”). “Advisory counsel” do not participate in trial proceedings while
“standby counsel” may be expected to assume the defense if the defendant is not able to
continue. Id.
292. Some courts have indicated that standby counsel serves the dual purposes of providing a “safety net” in ensuring a fair trial and of eliminating delays. Anne Bowen
Poulin, The Role of Standby Counsel in Criminal Cases: In the Twilight Zone of the
Criminal Justice System, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 676, 707 (2000) (citing United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1018–19 (3d Cir. 1993); State v. Ortisi, 706 A.2d 300, 308–09 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)). Standby Counsel can participate in the trial only to the extent that they do not usurp actual control or interfere with the perception of control. Id.
293. Standby counsel are not normally permitted to actively represent the defendant.
See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984). The McKaskle Court stated that:
[T]he pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he
chooses to present to the jury. . . . If standby counsel’s participation over the
defendant’s objection effectively allows counsel to make or substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions, or to control the questioning of witnesses, or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of importance, the
Faretta right is eroded.
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interests of justice and those of the defendant are duly protected. 294 Assigned Counsel in Milosevic essentially functioned as “hybrid” counsel,
as they shared the role of defense counsel with the Accused. This constituted a “co-counsel” model 295 which involved actual assistance in the
trial proceedings. Thus, the Accused simultaneously exercised his rights
to counsel and to represent himself, consistent with the nature of hybrid
representation. 296
4.2: Hybrid Representation and Milosevic
The hybrid model was the most suitable for the Milosevic case. Familiarity with the vast and countless facts, figures, locations, and witnesses
made the Accused more suited to conducting certain aspects of his defense. 297 This was particularly important as political and moral beliefs
were central to the Accused’s defense. 298 Hybrid representation allowed
Milosevic to publicly conduct cross-examination and examination-inchief while relinquishing to counsel those procedural and substantive
tasks which required the legal skills at which they excel. 299
Hybrid representation “is more likely to encourage efficiency and order
than to promote chaos.” 300 It also serves to preserve judicial neutrality. 301
This is because inexperienced pro se defendants often rely on judges for
assistance in legal and procedural matters, 302 and hybrid representation
Id. (emphasis added). When standby counsel assume the role of lead counsel, the relationship has evolved into an inadvertent form of hybrid representation. This consists of
“concurrent representation by both defendant and counsel.” State v. Cornell, 878 P.2d
1352, 1363 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc). Hybrid counsel participate in or assist in the preparation of such activities as opening statements, examination of witnesses and closing arguments. See, e.g., Metcalf v. State, 629 So.2d 558, 565 (Miss. 1993).
294. On the various benefits and inconveniences of these models, see Richard H.
Chused, Faretta and the Personal Defense: The Role of a Represented Defendant in Trial
Tactics, 65 CAL. L. REV. 636 (1977); Colquitt, supra note 36; Poulin, supra note 292;
Marie Higgins Williams, The Pro Se Criminal Defendant, Standby Counsel, and the
Judge: A Proposal for Better-Defined Roles, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 789 (2000); Michael P.
Erhard, Note, The Pro Se Defendant’s Right to Counsel, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 927, 940
(1972); Welcom, supra note 29.
295. Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1983).
296. Welcom, supra note 29, at 570.
297. See U.S ex rel. Davis v. McMann, 386 F.2d 611, 620 (2d Cir. 1967) (“[A] defendant who knows the facts of his case may indeed be better off defending himself without
an attorney than with an inadequately prepared one.”).
298. See Scharf, supra note 169; see also Erhard, supra note 294, at 932.
299. See Welcom, supra note 29, at 573.
300. Colquitt, supra note 36, at 107.
301. Id. at 108.
302. Chused, supra note 294, at 653 n.73 (citation omitted).
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can “protect[] the trial judge from the moral, if not legal, obligation to
help the defendant,” thus allowing “the judge to remain a neutral arbitrator rather than . . . becom[ing] an active participant in the trial.” 303 Furthermore, this also allows the victim, the prosecutor, and the witnesses to
see the judge as impartial. 304
Problems arise, however, from the ambiguity of the relationship between the hybrid counsel and the accused. 305 Without a defined role, hybrid counsel are cast into “an uncomfortable twilight zone.” 306 Normally
holding a position of complete autonomy and control, counsel must allow the accused to feel in control. 307 Thus, hybrid representation “poses
a risk of clashing wills.” 308 Moreover, while hybrid counsel are only supposed to assist when the accused so requests, well-intentioned co-counsel
often cannot remain idle while the defendant makes mistakes. 309 This
ultimately could lead to the accused feeling “short-changed” or to believe
that counsel is forcibly interfering with his case. This “undermines the
appearance of fairness and places counsel in the untenable position of
supporting a hostile pro se defendant.” 310
The Assigned Counsel in Milosevic overcame these obstacles, curbing
their public role in trial proceedings to the disputation of procedural matters beyond the expertise of the pro se Accused. The Assigned Counsel
comprehensively fulfilled their dual obligation to the Chamber and to the
Accused through the filing of innumerable public and confidential written submissions on behalf of the Accused, and responding on his behalf
and in his interests to those of the Office of the Prosecution, the Chambers and the Registry. 311 It is a credit to the professionalism, patience,
and sound judgment of Mr. Kay and Ms. Higgins that they fulfilled their
303. Welcom, supra note 29, at 584.
304. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on the Application
of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation Under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of
the Special Court, para. 26 (June 8, 2004).
305. See Howard, supra note 268, at 859.
306. Poulin, supra note 292, at 676.
307. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984).
308. Howard, supra note 268, at 861.
309. Williams, supra note 294, at 807.
310. Poulin, supra note 292, at 687.
311. The assignment of counsel “not only entail[s] obligations towards the client, but
also implies that [counsel] represents the interest of the Tribunal to ensure that the Accused receives a fair trial.” Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on Defence Counsel Motion to Withdraw, para. 21 (Nov. 2, 2000); see also United
States v. Swinney, 970 F.2d 494, 498–500 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that the “contentious
relationship” of the accused with counsel was not grounds for the withdrawal of the latter, given that the relationship of the accused with substitute counsel could be expected to
be equally fractious).
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duties without compromising the wishes of the Accused. Ultimately,
Milosevic maintained full control over the witnesses called in his defense, and over his defense strategy.
In conclusion, regardless of the substantive deficiencies of the Trial
Chamber decision, the Appeals Chamber must be commended for its application of the principle of proportionality to the manner in which the
Assigned Counsel would function in trial proceedings. It is hoped that
the application of the principle of non-intentional disruption to the right
of self-representation, particularly in the domain of ill health, will be
strictly circumscribed, and conducted in such a manner as to truly accord
“full equality” to the minimum defense guarantees of the accused, as required by Article 21(4) of the ICTY Statute.

